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ABSTRACT

The Challenges of Network Security Remediation at a Regional University
by
William R. Simons

This thesis describes challenges encountered during a year-long effort to
improve the security of the 3,300 node administrative computer network at East
Tennessee State University. The key remediation strategies used included
employing the vulnerability scanner Nessus to profile the network, analyzing the
scan results, and attempting to remove the most critical vulnerabilities found.
The project succeeded in decreasing known “high” criticality vulnerabilities on
campus by 26.1%, and confirmed four standard observations about the
challenges of network administration:

•

Vulnerability scanning is a lengthy task best performed in parallel
and supported by automated data analysis.

•

Securing a network is like trying to hit a moving target, due to an
ever-increasing proliferation of networked hosts, services enabled
by default install and lists of vulnerabilities to address.

•

Failures of common sense are still among the primary threats to
network security.

•

Failing to retain management support for the security hardening
process can jeopardize the project.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

This thesis details a year-long effort to determine and document the
challenges of improving network and computer security at a medium-sized
regional academic institution, East Tennessee State University (ETSU). At the time
of research, the ETSU administrative computer network (151.141.0.0/16) consisted
of 58 subnets containing approximately 3,300 total nodes which are
administered and maintained by the ETSU Office of Information Technology
(OIT) staff. The 3,300 nodes include server and workstation computers, network
printers, routers, hubs, switches, wireless access points and personal digital
assistants. ETSU has approximately 11,000 students and 3,000 faculty and
administrative staff.
Originally, the research goal was to conduct a more extensive case study
of network security vulnerability remediation than the one presented here. The
initial proposal involved a systematic attempt to detect, and address, all readily
detectable vulnerabilities on campus. This work was to include a monitoring of
all costs associated with performing said research and remediation. Performing
these tasks required local or domain level administrative credentials, which I was
originally promised but later denied, due to my student enrollment and lack of
full-time ETSU-OIT employee status. The study that was actually performed
focused on identifying specific high criticality level vulnerabilities present on the
7

ETSU administrative network and observing the challenges that hindered the
vulnerability assessment and remediation processes.
The data for this research was gathered using a mixture of node-specific
and campus-wide vulnerability sweeps using the open source vulnerability
scanner Nessus (versions 1.2.6 thru 2.1.0) [http://www.nessus.org], and the open
source network exploration application Nmap (versions 3.00 beta thru 3.50)
[http://www.insecure.org/nmap]. Each application was compiled, maintained,
routinely updated, and used on a Red Hat Linux (versions 7.2 thru 9.0)
[http://www.redhat.com] system which I administered. The Nessus and Nmap
scans started in May 2002 and ended in June 2003, with a supplemental Nmap
service discovery sweep in February, 2004.

1.1

Challenges Encountered

This study confirmed four standard observations about the challenges of
implementing network security in large computing environments. These
observations address the issues of scale, automation, process management,
and organizational roadblocks encountered at a management level.

•

Domain level vulnerability scanning is a massive task that is best
performed in parallel by multiple servers and supported by
automated data analysis. On average, a complete, sequential
8

scan using one Nessus server of a single host took approximately 16
minutes to complete. A sweep of the ~3,300 node ETSU network
took 10 days, and generated over 21,000 lines of vulnerability report
data. One of this thesis’s contributions, a set of supplemental
applications for summarizing Nessus vulnerability detail output,
digested and created a report using the full campus sweep data in
approximately 10 minutes versus the estimated 17 hours it would
have taken to review the data manually.
•

Securing a network is difficult, due to an ever-increasing
proliferation of networked hosts and default-install services, and an
ever-increasing queue of vulnerabilities to search for and repair.
The number of vulnerable Telnet, FTP, and HTTP servers increased by
approximately 100 every six months during this project, primarily due
to the increasing amount of embedded administration user
interfaces in hardware devices such as routers and switches and
default-install services in standard Windows and Linux operating
system installations. During the research and remediation tasks, the
number of high-risk vulnerabilities detected by the Nessus sweeps
decreased 26.1% from 1,211 to 895. However, during this same
period the total number of vulnerabilities that Nessus scanned for
increased from 933 to 2,088, or 223.8%. While these quantitative
results do not show a complete security hardening of the campus,
they do show an overall decrease of high-risk vulnerabilities directly
related to the work performed. These high-risk vulnerabilities were
affecting 36.7% of campus at the beginning of the research, and
27.1% of campus at the end, even with thirteen months of new
vulnerabilities becoming known and vulnerability plug-ins being
created by the Nessus community and being made public.
9

•

Failures of common sense are still among the most critical problems
for administrators to address. One operational Trojan horse, 15
administration accounts with null or extremely simplistic passwords,
and over 800 unnecessary or unknown services were found during
the initial campus vulnerability sweep.

•

Failing to retain organizational support for the duration of the
security remediation process can cause the entire project to come
to a complete standstill. Problems with organizational support,
which occurred several times during this research, included failure
to keep an agreement to grant administrator credentials needed to
facilitate the original study, and inconsistencies in operating
procedures and expectations created by a turnover in
management personnel, due to an insourcing of ETSU’s IT function.

This research’s primary contribution is the evidence it presents to support
the preceding conclusions, evidence that should prove useful to IT
management, system, network, and application administrators in the computer
and network security field.
Malicious computer hackers use academic institutions, which are
perceived as lightly funded organizations which rarely pursue prosecutions, as
training grounds to hone their skills and enhance their prestige among peers. I
believe that the challenges encountered, the applications created and the
data gathered while addressing computer, network and application
10

vulnerabilities at ETSU will mirror those faced by businesses, home computer
users, and other academic institutions, and will prove valuable for forecasting
required security hardening and remediation costs across various domains.
The remainder of this thesis is divided into four chapters: Chapter 2,
Background, describes the idea origins of this research, background security
research performed, details specific threats and strategies for network security,
and discusses the vulnerability assessment strategies and commercial tools used
for this research. Chapter 3, Research Methodology, describes the goals,
network and social environment, metrics, data gathering procedures and
software tools created for use in this research. Chapter 4, Project History and
Findings describes early events, initial lessons learned from the security
hardening and remediation process, presents the study’s key conclusions,
together with the evidence for these findings. Chapter 5, Conclusion,
summarizes the work performed, and presents a list of final recommendations
and the eventual actions taken by site management.
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND

This chapter describes the idea origins for this research, security specific
background research performed, details specific threats and strategies for
computer and network security, and discusses the vulnerability assessment
strategies and commercial tools used for this research.

2.1

Idea Origins

The idea for this research was born from my underlying interest and future
employment hopes in network and computer security and from multiple
conversations with my original thesis advisor, Dr. Phil Pfeiffer IV. One of these
conversations alerted me to a related thesis by fellow graduate student, James
P. Ashe (Jim). Jim was using the open source vulnerability assessment
application Nessus to profile and assess the ETSU administrative network. His
data described the number of vulnerabilities found per host, and detailed the
highest risk protocols, operating systems, applications and services. His data,
when combined with mine, could be used to show a computer security
hardening of the ETSU administrative network over a 3 year period.

12

2.2

Computer and Network Security Background

Computer, network and application security are growing in importance,
thanks to the increasing value of electronic data and that data’s impact on
and permeation into the public domain [Reynolds]. Computer security is “the
process of preventing and detecting unauthorized use of a computer”
[Howard]. A comparable definition holds for network and application security,
even though each is a distinct entity with different vulnerabilities.
The increasing importance of security affects businesses, the private
sector and academia in strikingly similar ways, which should dovetail with
challenges encountered in said domains and led to the research presented
here. Academic institutions, in particular, have historically been negligent in
security practices, allowing hackers to gain control of portions of their networks
through fairly simple means [Schwartau]. A lack of funding is often cited as a
key reason for inattention to security in academia. The research results
presented here could be used to support grants for further research into
academic network security, for increases of security budgets, and for educating
the general public about the severity of security threats to academic networks.
The focus of this research is virtual security: the task of securing information
stored in computers; messages transmitted through a computer network; and
resources accessed through on-line commands [Schneier]. Virtual security is
13

distinguished from physical security, which involves limiting physical access to a
system’s hardware. Physical security, although an important part of overall
information security, is not a focus of this research.

2.3 Threats and Fixes to Network and System Security

2.3.1 Vulnerability Definition

A security vulnerability is commonly defined as anything that offers a
potential avenue of attack against a system or network [TECS], for example,
viruses, improper system or application configurations, application backdoors,
and Trojan horses. In this research, the term vulnerability is used in a more limited
sense, to refer to flaws in a program’s configuration or logic that allow an
attacker to receive escalated privileges, disable application or service
operation or compromise computer data; that have been publicized in a wellknown listing of vulnerability reports; and that can be successfully neutralized,
using a publicly released fix, patch, or workaround. This more specific definition
of vulnerability is consistent with current expectations of system administrators,
who, as a rule, apply available vulnerability fixes (vulnerability remediation)—
and don’t create them. This remediation process typically includes changing
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file permissions, applying a group or domain level policy, setting an Operating
System configuration option or installing an available patch.

2.3.2 Specific Threats to Network Security

2.3.2.1 Cleartext Network Transmission. The basic unit of information
transfer in computer networks is the packet: a fragment of control or data
information whose size depends on the underlying network technology.
Numerous applications have been created that passively intercept and copy all
network traffic on a system, server, router or firewall [Chirillo]. These applications,
called protocol analyzers or sniffers, obtain access to network traffic by
exploiting the underlying network’s topology or by masquerading as a network
routing hardware device. Since computer systems commonly exchange
messages in cleartext [Steinke], protocol analyzers allow potential attackers to
intercept and alter information that they are not entitled to access, including
user authentication data.

15

2.3.2.2 Misconfigured and/or Unpatched Applications. Most
manufacturers of applications and operating systems issue fixes for potential
security holes in response to known exploits [Schwartau]. As a network security
“best practice”, these patches and hot fixes should be installed as they become
available, by the Information Technology support staff [Limoncelli].
Unfortunately, standard home users, small business operators and universities
generally lack the technical proficiency or budget to apply patches as they are
released. This inability to keep current is the primary reason malicious hackers
have opportunities to penetrate a computer or network host.

2.3.2.3 Well-known or Default Install Accounts. Well-known accounts,
those that applications create or support by default, are standard avenues for
system or network compromise. These accounts include ‘root’, ‘admin’, ‘guest’,
‘administrator’, ‘sa’, and ‘operator’ to name a few. Another best practice in
network and computer security is to rename these well-known accounts for
administrative use, and then to create unprivileged, “dummy” accounts in their
place [Technet]. Activity involving the newly created dummy ‘root’, ‘admin’,
‘guest’, ‘administrator’, ‘sa’, or ‘operator’ accounts can then be monitored
using application, system, and network logs as a security check for attempted,
non-authorized intrusions. The combination of these “best practices” of network
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security, when implemented successfully, constitute host or network defense-indepth.

2.3.2.4 Denial of Service Attacks. Denials of Service (DoS), Distributed
Denial of Service (DDoS), and Out of Band (OoB) attacks have become
common because they are easy and inexpensive to implement [Schneier].
Such attacks hurt their victims by monopolizing the target’s resources. DoS and
DDoS attacks consume resources on the target machine or network, impeding
their normal operation. Out of Band attacks use oversized, malformed,
fragmented or otherwise specifically altered individual or packet streams to
disrupt the target machine’s TCP stack.
DoS and DDoS attacks, although primitive in complexity, can be
devastating in the real world [Scambray]. An example DoS/DDoS attack is the
CHARGEN attack on Microsoft’s SQL Ping service. This service, which is installed
by default with Microsoft SQL Server 2000, allows a client to ping a port of the
client’s choice. Hackers can disable a host that supports this service by creating
simple scripts that continually request this service to ping a CHARGEN service on
another machine. Every custom-crafted packet sent to CHARGEN causes
millions of packets to be directed to the victim’s machine. A few compromised
machines, or zombies, running these scripts are enough overwhelm the SQL
server’s ability to respond, thereby disabling the database service. Fortunately,
17

Microsoft implemented the SQL ping service running on a UDP port, which differs
from a TCP port and does not require a full end to end connection. Because of
this UDP implementation, more attempts are needed to disrupt the service. Still,
the service is installed by default on SQL Server 2000 and creates a DoS target.
The innate problem with defending against DoS, DDoS, OoB and flood
attacks is their inherent simplicity. Script Kiddies—novice hackers who depend
on other people’s scripts to perform attacks—can effectively disrupt or disable
access to network or computer resources without the level of technical
practical understanding usually associated with hacking attacks. These styles of
attacks can vary from the small and mildly annoying case of tying up a shared
printer or resource, to the extremely costly disruption of an enterprise level web
or database server.

2.3.3 Strategies for Breaking into Computers and Networks

Strategies for breaking into single computers and networks of computers
are similar. In most cases, hackers who target an unfamiliar network or
computer will footprint (i.e., scout) it to determine the network structure,
defenses and possibly the hardware and software in use [Scambray].
Footprinting can involve rummaging through trash for discarded data, using
network transmissions to determine the operating system or services in use, and
18

searching news groups for informative email from the target organization
[Scambray]. A relatively new form of footprinting involves web log (blog)
searches for employee online journals. Blogs, like newsgroup postings and the
other footprinting sources described, can betray the target organization’s
underlying policies, procedures, applications and hardware.
Footprinting can occur from inside and outside a network, although
footprinting from outside is the most common [Schwartau]. A key objective of a
footprinting session is to discover a system’s or network’s open ports and the
privilege levels of the applications that “own” these ports. Open ports are
analogous to open doors into the target system or network. Every open port is
associated with a program that “owns” it: i.e., responds to requests directed
toward that port. Microsoft SQL Server 2000 runs by default on port 1433. Most
web servers run by default on port 80. Almost all services have an associated
default port. The level of privilege of the program that owns a given port
determines the damage that hacker that subverts that port can do. If, for
example, a port is open and the attached service is running as user “root” or
“administrator”, a compromise of the service attached to that port will afford a
hacker high level root or administrative access to the underlying system or
network device.
Footprinting would be used by an intruder to discover services available
to the public. An administrator discussing current projects on a newsgroup, a
faculty member posting their thoughts on the current mail server roll-out, or
19

simple port scanning of the academic network IP range can advise the hacker
of the application/server version and patch levels, and from that point the trivial
next step to research available vulnerabilities for the services found on the
academic network. Entry level hackers use Nessus to profile a target, and get
an extremely descriptive readout on potential areas of attack. This would
generate a large signature easily tracked by administrators by reviewing access
log files, but generally isn’t watched for by Universities due to the previously
discussed budgetary concerns found in academia.

2.4 Security Vulnerability Assessments

2.4.1 Motivation for Vulnerability Assessment

Information security authorities advise administrators to conduct regular
assessments of their networks’ vulnerability level, as a starting point for
discovering and repairing known vulnerabilities [Bott]. Since networked
communication is managed through a system’s network ports, those ports are
the starting point for checking for vulnerabilities. An administrative awareness of
a system or network’s open ports, vulnerabilities, and services also increases the
ability to determine available avenues for attack or even when an attack may
be underway.
20

2.4.2 Strategies for Vulnerability Assessment

The two principal strategies for assessing security vulnerabilities are black
box [Webopedia] and crystal box [Lam] assessment. In a black box assessment,
the security auditor performs a stock set of network-based probes and scans on
the target domain; no inside knowledge of the target computer or network
environment is assumed. This style of probing and scanning simulates the
footprinting performed by an external hacker with a limited knowledge of the
target system. In a crystal box vulnerability assessment, the intrusion test team is
provided with insider knowledge of the system to be tested, typically in the form
of network diagrams and system names, IP addresses, platforms, and lists of
services and datasets hosted by the network’s devices. This testing strategy
simulates an attack by a disgruntled employee, or a collusion situation involving
multiple attackers with insider information.

2.4.3

Vulnerability Assessment Tools

At the time of writing, there is no single vulnerability assessment
application that performs all of the different audits recommended by authorities
on network security. Accordingly, system and network administration best
21

practice involves the use of multiple scanning applications and techniques to
help ensure network security. The work described in this thesis relied on two
commonly used applications for assessing network security: the Nmap port
scanner and the Nessus vulnerability auditor.

2.4.3.1 Nmap. Nmap is a port scanning security auditor used in both
black and crystal box assessment that supports the use of three strategies for
footprinting hosts. Nmap can ping a set of hosts to determine which hosts are
alive, and scan a host’s ports to determine what services it supports. Nmap can
also use a database of characteristics to determine what operating system a
host is running. By default, Nmap performs a ping sweep to find live hosts and
scans their ports, using the standard services-to-port reference matrix included
with the Nmap installation. Nmap can scan network hosts using one of six
methods: TCP connect() scans, TCP SYN scans, stealth FIN scans, Xmas tree
scans, Null scans, UDP scans, and ping scans.
Nmap identifies services using its service-to-port association matrix. This
allows some margin of error, as a FTP server (default port 21) configured to run
on port 23 (the default port for Telnet) will return as a Telnet server in Nmap. This
use of non-standard ports is typically motivated by a desire to evade firewall
controls—ISP’s, for example, routinely block port 80, prompting some users of
broadband Internet services to run web servers on port 8080—or to disguise a
22

service’s presence. Using non-standard ports to enhance system security is not
considered a best practice: a determined attacker will locate these services,
using techniques like complete port scanning and banner enumeration and
banner recognition [Scambray].

2.4.3.2 Nessus. The Nessus vulnerability assessment tool was first released
to the public in April of 1998 [Kooij]. At the time of research, Nessus is not
funded by any corporate entities or committees, and is maintained as a
community service by its authors and a small group of Nessus enthusiasts. Nessus
is structured as a two-part application that consists of a server (Nessusd)
application, which probes target systems, and a client (Nessus) application,
which submits requests for probes to the server. The client is currently available
for UNIX and Windows platforms, while the server is only available for Unix-based
machines.
Nessus attempts to locate vulnerabilities by communicating with hosts,
using standard application protocols. For example, if Nessus determines it is
testing a web server, Nessus will communicate with the server using HTTP. If
Nessus is testing a Windows share or fileserver, it will communicate using NetBIOS
and SMB.
Nessus supports two primary strategies for vulnerability checking: banner
recognition and service-specific testing [Deraison1]. Service-specific testing,
23

which uses a sequence of application-specific messages to identify the remote
application, was incorporated into Nessus on the assumption that neither
banners nor version numbers can be relied on for service discovery and
vulnerability assessment. Nessus can even be configured to attack the targeted
host, thereby reducing the number of false positives in the vulnerability
assessment. Attacking a machine, however, can crash that machine or disrupt
its services and is not advised in a production environment.
Nessus can be controlled using its graphical user interface, or with
command line batch scripts. Nessus uses a built in proprietary scripting
language, based on C, called the Nessus Attack Scripting Language (NASL)
[Deraison3]. A standard set of scripts for identifying standard exploits is
distributed through the Nessus website, at http://cgi.nessus.org/plugins. Each
prepackaged script, or plug-in, usually references a CERT, Bugtraq, or vendor
security alert for associated vulnerability. As of summer 2004, there were 2,088
Nessus plug-in tests, divided into 23 different families that included Backdoors,
CGI abuses, CISCO, Denial of Service, Finger abuses, Firewalls, FTP, Remote shell
access, Remote root access, General, Misc., Netware, NIS, Port scanners,
Remote file access, RPC, Settings, SMTP problems, SNMP, Untested, Useless
services, Windows and Windows:User management.
Nessus’s architecture allows network administrators to craft their own
vulnerability checks for exploits that do not yet have associated plug-ins. The
library of standard Nessus plug-ins, however, is updated routinely as new
24

vulnerabilities appear. NASL plug-ins for high-profile exploits have been created
in as little as two hours following the public disclosure of those exploits.
Nessus creates host vulnerability reports in many different formats,
including XML, HTML, ASCII, LaTeX, and a proprietary format called NSR
[Deraison2]. These reports list all detected vulnerabilities, usually citing links to
fixes and risk levels from Low to Very High. Network scans, unfortunately,
generate an enormous amount of raw text, and must be used in conjunction
with some type of digesting utility to make them manageable. Such a utility is
described in section 3.4.2.1 and in Appendix B.2.
The Nessus server runs as root, allowing Nessus to craft packets, access the
libpcap library, and bind ports below 1024 to sockets. Nessus uses Nmap to
implement port scanning, Nikto and/or Whisker to identify and probe Web
servers and CGIs, and Hydra to provide brute force attacks for common services
(telnet, web, pop3, Imap, etc.) [Deraison4].
Nessus uses a lot of bandwidth for scanning, as noted by the following
observation in the Nessus FAQ:
“Now assume we test 65536 TCP ports. This will require at least a single
packet per port that is at least 40 bytes large. Add 14 bytes for the
ethernet (sic) header and you will send 65536 * (40 + 14) = 3670016
bytes. So for just probing all TCP ports we may need a multitude of this
as Nmap will try to resend the packets twice if no response is received.
A very rough estimate is that a full scan for UDP, TCP and RPC as well as
all NASL scripts may result in 8 to 32 MB wrth (sic) of traffic per scanned
25

host. Reducing the amount of tested part and such will reduce the
amout (sic) of data to be transfered (sic) significantly.” [Kooij]
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CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This chapter describes the research goals, planning, network environment,
metrics, procedures and software tools created and used during the year long
security hardening process.

3.1 Research Goals

The research presented here sought to determine the approximate cost
of security hardening ETSU’s network, and the benefits that would accrue to the
university from this work. A four-part plan was used to pursue this goal:

•

identify network and system vulnerabilities on campus;

•

advise the OIT staff of the most critical vulnerability instances found;

•

monitor costs associated with performing the vulnerability sweeps;
and

•

extrapolate to obtain an approximate assessment of the costs
accrued from hardening the security of the campus network.

27

3.2 Research Environment

At the time of this research, the ETSU administrative computer network
(151.141.0.0/16) consisted of 58 subnets containing approximately 3,300 total
nodes, administered and maintained by the ETSU OIT staff. The ETSU
administrative computer network included approximately 80 servers, 2900
workstation computers and 300 printers, routers, hubs, switches, wireless access
points and personal digital assistants [Ashe]. ETSU has approximately 11,000
students and 3,000 faculty and administrative staff. The vulnerability scans for
this research started in May 2002 and ended in June 2003, with a supplemental
Nmap service discovery sweep in February, 2004.
I was allowed to use one Nessus server, which ran on a Pentium 2
workstation running at 400Mhz with 384 megabytes of RAM. I also had access to
a Windows 2000 workstation, which was of similar hardware configuration. The
supplemental applications created and discussed in this document in section
3.4.2 were done so using a Dell Inspiron 8100 laptop which I own.

3.3 Research Metrics

Two main strategies were used to assess the effectiveness of the security
assessment procedures used in this research. First, the number of “high”
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criticality flaws discovered by Nessus during the initial rounds of campus
vulnerability sweeps were compared with those found during the final round of
sweeps thirteen months later. This data, paired with the number of hosts on
campus and the total number of vulnerabilities Nessus was searching for, gave a
percentage of campus hosts affected by high-risk vulnerabilities. Second,
unknown service permeation across campus was also tracked, using Nmap to
sweep the campus and identify all services available at the beginning and end
of the research.

3.4 Research Procedures

70% of the scans performed during this research started as a complete
campus sweep for a single, or a select few, high priority vulnerabilities. Scan
targets were selected based on their Nessus assigned priority and the wishes of
my OIT supervisors. The remaining scans, which I referred to as “go to guy”
scans, were normally requested on short notice and required prompt attention.
These included scans of campus mail servers, and checks for specific NETBIOS
names, specific open ports, and recently disclosed day-0 type vulnerabilities.
Since OIT, in an effort to conserve network bandwidth and intrusiveness, allowed
me to perform no more than one scan at any one time, and use only one
machine for the duration of my research, these “go to guy” scans required me
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to interrupt any scan that was currently underway and dedicate my Nessus
server effort to the new scan task.
Nessus vulnerability sweeps, either of a host or an entire network, generate
NSR Nessus vulnerability assessment files. These files are extremely large in size,
and a small sample of a file is presented in Appendix D.2.1 of this document.
After reviewing the Nessus generated vulnerability information for campus,
I was tasked with contacting the primary user of the affected machine and my
OIT support representative to schedule a patch appointment. I used templated
email correspondence in an effort to decrease the amount of time it took to
schedule and complete a “round-trip” vulnerability patching session.

3.4.1 Data Gathering

Network vulnerability assessments used a hybrid of the crystal and black
box approaches. Assessments were performed inside the campus network
firewall, but with a purposely limited knowledge of system functionality and
network topology. This style of scanning simulated footprinting by a typical oncampus user: e.g., a rogue student, a former employee, or a malicious outsider
who used an unsecured wireless access point to scout the campus network. This
strategy also generated a more complete characterization of ETSU network
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security, as the campus firewall did not shield many of the vulnerabilities that I
detected because of port-based incoming firewall rules.
The Nmap port scanner was used to footprint ETSU’s networks because it is
fast, convenient, and free: currently, there are no other tools available that are
as fast, accurate and widely used as Nmap. Nessus’s “safe mode”, which relies
entirely on banner recognition for vulnerability assessment, was used to check
for specific vulnerabilities. “Safe mode” was used because the alternative, the
use of actual exploit code, was deemed too potentially damaging to
production services and devices on the ETSU administrative network.
Over the course of the research, I conducted 39 complete campus
sweeps. Most of these sweeps were specific to a few high profile or recently
discovered vulnerabilities. Most sweeps were conducted between Tuesday
morning and Thursday evening, when it was found that most nodes on campus
were accessible. Generally, Nessus was used to find vulnerabilities, while Nmap
was used to locate new services available on the network or to get a quick list
of a particular type of service (email, web, etc.). These sweeps lasted from
several hours up to 10 days. I wrote a set of scripts to automate sweeps, and to
allow “major” sweeps to be paused and restarted following “go-to guy” scan
interruption. I also used SSH to remotely log in to my ETSU computer and check
on the status of a sweep at any time. This afforded me complete 24/7 access,
even when my computer was locked up after hours in the ETSU OIT data center.
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Unfortunately, the resulting Nessus generated vulnerability assessments
were full of false positives, thanks to the all too common practice of application
creators distributing patches that fail to update an application’s version or
release number. Nessus running in safe mode relies on banners and version
numbers to assess patch levels. This practice incorrectly interprets a patched
machine with an incorrect version number as being vulnerable to a particular
exploit, when it is not. When an OIT representative would visit a machine and
identify a Nessus-reported vulnerability as a false positive, we would mark the
vulnerability resolved, and take no further action. False positives became an
increasing problem during my own research, but I never tracked them, or
measured the time they took to resolve. In the future, studies like this that rely on
Nessus should track false positives and account for their drain on staff time.

3.4.2 Creating Custom Applications

During my research, I developed several administrative scripts and four
major supporting applications for Nessus: an .NSR parser, a command line Nessus
daemon respawner, a remote TCP service monitor and a localhost file
modification watcher. These scripts and applications reduced the time needed
to analyze NSR vulnerability report data by as much as 17x, and simplified Nessus
administrative duties such as backing up the research data, ensuring services
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were up and running, parsing the system logs for important information, and
downloading operating system updates to ensure my Nessus server was kept up
to date.

3.4.2.1 Nessus Log Parsers (VB6.0 and VBA 6.3). Each Nessus vulnerability
scan of the ETSU administrative network created over 21,000 lines of vulnerability
result information. As part of an earlier study (cf. §2.1), James Ashe created a
C++ .NSR parser that reduced the content of a Nessus vulnerability scan to
matrix form. I used Visual Basic 6 to extend his application into an .NSR report
parser that creates a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet of critical vulnerabilities
detected during a sweep. This spreadsheet was then forwarded to OIT
personnel, who used it to plan patch updates. My initial manual review of the
first campus sweep took me approximately 17 hours. After this first review, I
created and began using the VB6 based .NSR parser which decreased the time
it took to analyze a complete campus scan to just over an hour.
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Figure 1. Output from Nessus NSR Vulnerability Output Parser

3.4.2.2 Nessus CLI Respawner (Shell Scripting). When I first started to scan
the ETSU network, I used a single Nessus job to scan for all known Nessus
vulnerabilities. I did not attempt multiple, concurrent scans of the network
because of OIT concerns about the possible drain on the network’s bandwidth
and the insistence that I only have use of one Nessus server. These early scans,
which took over 37 days to complete, used a now-obsolete version of Nessus
that contained a client GUI memory leak that slowed large sweeps over time
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[Deraison]. Since ETSU uses DHCP to dynamically allocate IP addresses to
network hosts, the rate at which scans were completing was completely
unacceptable as some machines could be missed or scanned twice if they
were rebooted, depending on the new IP address they were given and the
status of the current vulnerability sweep. I also faced an almost unmanageable
task of matching DHCP IP addresses to MAC addresses inside the .NSR data file
to ensure that my report information did not include duplicate nodes.
In an attempt to make these lengthy scans more manageable, I created
a shell script that used a sequence of Nessus jobs to scan the network. The
script, which accepted a set of subnets to scan and a Nessusd configuration file
as input, reduced the total network scan time to approximately 10 days. The
improvements in scan time resulted from the script’s practice of restarting the
Nessus client prior to every subnet scan, thereby reducing the impact the
memory leak in the Nessus GUI discussed above. In subsequent scans, I used this
shell script and customized configuration files to sweep the campus for specific,
recently discovered or popular vulnerabilities or for the presence of remote
administration applications such as BackOrifice and PCAnywhere.

3.4.2.3 Remote TCP Service Monitor (VB6.0). During one of my campus
sweeps, the ETSU campus suffered a prolonged power outage, which required
me to restart my scan when campus power was restored. This incident exposed
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a need for a supporting application that alerted me when the Nessus server quit
operating. I created an application that monitors activity on Nessus’ default
port, 1241, on a user-specified server. This application uses a config file to
determine how to notify users when Nessus fails: e-mail, for example, is one of
the supported options. It has since been enhanced to monitor any TCP based
service and supports text file logging, audible alerts, and remote database entry
creation.

Figure 2. Remote TCP Service Monitor
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Figure 3. Remote TCP Service Monitor Options

3.4.2.4 Localhost File Modification Watcher (VB.NET). As a part of this
research, I created a file modification watcher application and used it to check
for evidence of compromise on a reportedly sluggish host. A Nessus sweep of
this host uncovered several vulnerabilities, and an Nmap port sweep revealed
the presence of an application that was using a high numbered port to listen for
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incoming connections. Nmap, however, failed to name the offending
application because of its high numbered port and obscurity and its failure to
generate a banner. To learn more about the anomaly, I created an application
that displayed, in real time, the name of every file that was being accessed by a
local file modification operation (created, deleted, renamed, etc.). I then
connected to the suspect port, using telnet, which triggered a local file
modification, and used this information to locate the offending application. This
allowed me to determine that the host had been compromised using a recently
disclosed Yahoo Instant Messenger stack overflow vulnerability, and was using
an eggdrop IRC server.

Figure 4. Localhost File Modification Watcher
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CHAPTER 4
PROJECT HISTORY AND FINDINGS
This chapter describes early events, initial lessons learned from the security
hardening and remediation process, presents the study’s key conclusions,
together with the evidence for these findings.

4.1 Project History

I started research and fieldwork for this master’s thesis on April 16, 2002
when I met with my initial advisor, Dr. Phil Pfeiffer, and Mr. Bob Cook and Mr.
Allan Baldwin of OIT to discuss project goals and logistics. Dr. Pfeiffer
represented the interests of the ETSU Computer Science department, and Bob
Cook and Allan Baldwin represented the ETSU OIT. Bob Cook would later
become my direct supervisor during the project. On April 17, I contacted James
Ashe and gained access to his preliminary ETSU network security audit data. On
April 28, I met with Janet Keener, a manager from OIT User Services who was
one of my main resources for contacting computer users. Janet taught me how
to use the ETSU computer user and equipment database application named
REMEDY. I concluded the initial phase of the work by reading the ETSU
Acceptable User Policy, Code of Ethics, and a memo from Dr. Paul Stanton,
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president of East Tennessee State University, to all university staff regarding
computer network usage policy.
Starting on May 14, I began spending two days a week on the ETSU
campus working exclusively on fieldwork to collect data for my research. As a
network security novice, I initially needed to identify a set of tools to use for
assessing network security. The common tools for systems and network security
auditing are applications and operating systems such as SSH, Linux, Nmap and
Nessus [Top 50 Security Tools]. I gained valuable experience using and
administering Nmap and Nessus, performed additional research on security
trends, and started creating the supplemental applications described previously
in this document.
Once vulnerabilities were found, it was my job to coordinate the patching
session with my OIT contacts. I quickly discovered that liaison work for patch
management represented another soft cost that I had failed to properly identify
earlier in the research management process. Professors often limit their contact
hours to prescheduled office hours, during which they are often extremely busy.
This increased the number of visits required per computer in order to obtain the
expected approval for patching. I attempted to limit visitation time by using email templates and multiple phone calls to schedule office visits when needed,
but with only limited success. Some users found it hard to imagine that their
machine had been compromised and would question my methods and ask to
speak to my direct supervisors. While checking my credentials was an
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understandable action, I found that, for some users, it was more of a “shoot the
messenger” situation where I was being blamed for discovering the vulnerability
or complete system compromise.
I also found that some faculty members and students were using software
firewalls to harden their own computers. The use of software firewalls is a good
practice, but it complicated scanning by severely increasing the time required
to complete a scan. It was easy to configure Nessus to fragment its scans to
“drill” thru software firewalls. Unfortunately, hosts with software firewalls routinely
block IP pings. Nessus ordinarily uses ping to determine whether a host is on the
network before scanning it, as a way of avoiding the overhead of scanning IP
addresses that are not assigned to an active host. The use of fragmented
Nessus scans increased the amount of time to complete the scan so much that
OIT decided that default campus sweeps be configured to not fragment the
vulnerability probes. This allowed scans to finish early enough to be reviewed;
however, any machine on the network that did not answer a ping request was
not scanned for vulnerabilities. Normally, machines with software firewalls are
employed by power users who have a lower percentage of vulnerabilities on
their own machines. Still, this failure to scan all hosts is a risk that must be
addressed if this research is repeated elsewhere and a complete security
assessment is attempted.
The applications I created for this research took approximately a month to
design, develop, implement and test. Scanning the ETSU network for all known
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(to Nessus) vulnerabilities took, on average, 10 days. The costs of patching
vulnerabilities were the hardest to track, because other people did the work. In
most cases, it took two personnel contacts (via email or phone) to schedule a
patch time, and approximately 10 minutes on site to download an update or
modify an application configuration (per vulnerability found). The complete
contact and patch process generally took between 3 and 4 business days to
complete.
4.2 Findings
The study’s primary findings about the challenges of network hardening
can be divided into four categories: challenges posed by the use of Nessus for
large network scanning; challenges posed by the evolving nature of network
services; challenges posed by the lack of user common sense in host and
network management; and challenges posed by a lack of adequate support
by high-level administration.

4.2.1 On the Use of Nessus to Scan Large Networks

Single vulnerability scans (“go to guy scans”) of the 3,300 node ETSU
network took approximately an hour and a half to complete, while complete
sequential vulnerability scans took 10 days. Fortunately, the Nessus vulnerability
reporting engine allows nodes scanned to be identified by either IP address or
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MAC address. Using the unique MAC address to identify node vulnerability is
suggested on large networks, as IP address reuse can be widespread in DHCP
networks. Based on the time it takes to scan a large network with one Nessus
server, it is advised that vulnerability scanning be automated, and performed in
parallel. Had I been able to use multiple Nessus servers, say one on each subnet
to perform the complete Nessus sweeps of campus, it would have taken an
estimated 15 hours to complete versus the 240 it took using a single Nessus
server. Multiplying this difference (225) by the number of scans performed over
the course of the research (39) yields an estimated time savings of 219 40-hour
person-weeks (8775 hours).
Automated parsers should also be used to summarize the vulnerability
information inside NSR reports. The NSR parser cut the time needed to review a
3,300 node vulnerability assessment from 17 hours to an hour. Again, multiplying
this difference (16) by the number of scans performed over the course of the
research (39) yields an estimated time savings of 15½ 40-hour person-weeks (624
hours).
It is important to note that the described estimated time savings take
place before a single user is contacted or patch is applied.
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4.2.2 On the Effect of Service Evolution on Network Security Management

The attempted elimination of unknown services across the ETSU
administrative network was a secondary goal for this project. The following
chart shows a decrease in unknown non-critical (echo, qotd, chargen) servers
on the ETSU campus from December 2002 to February 2004. However, the
overall number of services on the ETSU network increased over the course of the
study. I believe this increase reflects an emerging trend in the technology
industry to package routers, switches, printers, PDAs and other devices with
telnet, FTP and web server administrative front ends as a convenience to the
end user. This dramatic increase in administrative servers on campus, paired
with common sense failures of not changing default or using simplistic
passwords, represented an increasing bulk of “high” denoted vulnerabilities
found on campus by each Nessus sweep.
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SERVICE

PORT

Echo
daytime
Qotd
chargen
ftp
Ssh
telnet
Smtp
Time
gopher
finger
http
pop3
nntp
Irc
https
Doom
sub7
netbus
netbus2
BackOrifice

7
13
17
19
21
22
23
25
37
70
79
80
110
119
194
443
666
1243
1245
20034
31337
TOTAL

SERVERS FOUND
12/02
4/03
2/04
64
47
39
1
41
34
29
15
18
59
41
32
188
195
251
32
43
69
465
445
595
70
58
82
28
101
20
1
2
6
0
47
41
437
525
457
17
7
23
24
22
25
0
0
4
86
81
142
1
0
4
0
0
4
0
0
5
2
0
4
3
1
4
1507 1671
1859
AVG
TOTAL

Change Over Time
diff 1/2 diff 2/3 diff 1/3
-17
-8
-25
40
-7
33
-14
3
-11
-18
-9
-27
7
56
63
11
26
37
-20
150
130
-12
24
12
73
-81
-8
1
4
5
47
-6
41
88
-68
20
-10
16
6
-2
3
1
0
4
4
-5
61
56
-1
4
3
0
4
4
0
5
5
-2
4
2
-2
3
1
7.8095
164

8.9524
188

16.7619
352

Figure 5. Service Trending Information, 12/2002 thru 2/2004

4.2.3 On the Common Sense of Users and Support Personnel

The initial vulnerability sweep of the campus network identified 15
accounts that used null or extremely simplistic passwords. These accounts
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included default install accounts still using their default password such as the
SQL Server administrative account “sa” using the null password, and simplistic
common passwords such as “admin”, “administrator”, “root”, or “password”.
These common sense failures, on the part of both normal, non-technical users
and the information technology support staff, present security vulnerabilities that
could be mitigated with the enforced use of properly devised security policies
and procedures.

4.2.4 On the Criticality of Obtaining and Retaining Administrative Support

Administrative support was one of the most influential factors in
completing this research, and one that I initially overlooked. Over the course of
this study, I was repeatedly forced to abandon straightforward strategies for
network hardening, due to management-imposed restrictions on my ability to
access the network.
Initially, I intended to sweep the ETSU campus for all vulnerabilities that I
could find and patch them immediately. This strategy failed due to the sheer
size of the campus network and the extreme amount of time it required to
complete a full campus sweep. I had hoped to use multiple Nessus servers to
decrease the amount of time it would take to perform the full vulnerability
sweep, but the request was denied by OIT management due to the network
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bandwidth each sweep was using and their allotment of only one machine to
use for this research.
I then tried to sweep the campus building by building (most buildings on
the ETSU campus are their own subnet) and patch the vulnerabilities found. This
required me to have a domain level administration account to easily patch any
machine on campus, and was also denied by OIT management due to my
student enrollment status and lack of full-time employment within the OIT
support organization (I was an employee of the university, but in the computer
science department).
Finally, I decided to sweep the campus for one vulnerability at a time (or
a handful at the most), in order from the worst vulnerabilities that Nessus looked
for to the least dangerous ones. Once I identified a set of vulnerabilities, I
relayed the information to the OIT staff, and they applied the available patch.
Typical OIT response time was between one and three days, depending on the
vulnerability criticality, the management driven security motivation that month,
and the current workload of OIT personnel.
In addition to the time required to research and develop the procedures, I
devoted far more time than I had anticipated to human concerns that arose
during the course of routine system management. The extent, importance, and
difficulty of this “soft” work, which mounted from day one, were largely
overlooked in my initial planning for the project. The work included, but not
limited to, personal interactions with faculty, staff and students about fixing
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vulnerabilities I found on their machines, staying current on breaking vulnerability
data, and dealing with various challenges presented by OIT management of
the project.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION

This chapter summarizes the work performed and presents final
recommendations and the eventual actions taken by site management based
on the data presented in this document.

5.1 General Observations

My research on network security evolved over time, in response to
obstacles created by university policies for computer administration. Originally, I
had intended to track security costs involving application design, development,
and testing, vulnerability scanning times, physical patching or performing
security hardening exercises, and administrative-project management time. As
the constraints on my research changed, so did the goals for the thesis, and the
strategies used to achieve them.
I did not anticipate how hard and time consuming it would be to
administer and manage the entire research process myself. This effort, in part,
involved teaching myself how to perform research. I attempted to alleviate
administrative headaches, in part, by tracking the work performed and setting
goals for each day or week. This allowed me to break the project into “baby
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steps” that I could easily perform each day or week to continue to work towards
the final goal. One of the work logs I created (and supplied OIT administration
and my thesis committee) is shown in appendix D.1.
As discussed in chapters 3 and 4, automating sweeps and data analysis
did much to streamline the work of research. While automation is a network
administrative best practice, nonetheless it surprised me that I saved over 26
days in pure scan time, and over 16 hours in scan analysis per campus sweep by
automating tasks using the applications I created for this research. These
particular cost savings were only possible because of my ability to rapidly create
shell scripts and applications as needed, in multiple development environments.
The original goal of determining the amount of time needed to apply
patches to vulnerable machines was not met, due in part to OIT’s policy of
limiting the work of system patching to full-time OIT employees. In retrospect,
changes in ETSU’s procedures for administering the campus network that were
instituted near the end of this project would have rendered any data gathered
during the first part of the project moot. In April 2004, OIT rolled out a centralized
patch management system which largely eliminated the need for visiting a
machine to apply patches. Microsoft Software Update Services (SUS) is an
administration tool that allows domain administrators access to control the
‘Automatic Updates’ control panel object in Windows 2000, Windows XP and
Windows 2003 systems. This allowed the OIT staff to test and automate patch
application campus wide and not have to visit each machine.
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5.2 Specific Recommendations for Maintaining Network Security

My review of the data generated by the year-long security audit,
including all vulnerabilities and challenges encountered, yielded the following
recommendations for hardening the ETSU administrative network:

•

Confirm that the latest operating system and application patches are
installed. In most cases, security updates and application fixes are
incorporated into operating system patches and are available from the
OS vendor. Starting with Windows 2000 Service Pack 3, Microsoft
operating systems can be configured to automatically download critical
operating system updates to reduce administration network
management strain and massive failure due to a new malicious virus or
worm. Similarly, Red Hat Linux operating systems can also be configured
with a crontab entry using the up2date application bundled with the OS
to keep the operating system updated. Keeping these operating systems
updated automatically is fairly simple to set up; however keeping
applications and services up to date is a task which still must be
performed manually by support personnel.

•

Disable unused or unneeded services. This will reduce the number of entry
points into systems and reduce the number of security holes created by
newly discovered vulnerabilities. If a particular service is not enabled, no
one can use it to compromise your systems or network.
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•

Install Anti-Virus Software and Updates. It is imperative to install anti-virus
software on all workstations and servers and keep them up-to-date with
the latest virus signatures.

•

Ensure system Administrator accounts have a strong password. The
Administrator account's password should be at least 9 characters long
and include at least 1 punctuation mark OR non-printing ASCII character
within the first 7 characters. In addition, the Administrator account
password should not be synchronized across multiple servers. Different
passwords should be used on each server to raise the level of security in
the workgroup or domain based on the standard defined in the network
security policy.

•

Disable guest accounts.

•

Create a position or assign an existing OIT network administrator or analyst
a recurring duty of scanning the network for vulnerabilities and patching
systems as needed. I feel that the results of the sweeps I performed
clearly indicate that this is a necessity.

Upon completion of this research, the previous points were submitted and
discussed with OIT support personnel. Those suggestions, paired with the
vulnerability data and service permeation data obtained during this research,
motivated OIT management to pursue the previously described centralized
patch management system and automated patch installation scheduler. The
implementation of a campus firewall and a subsequent hardening of the
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inbound/outbound traffic rules on this firewall allowed OIT management to
control the type and amount of traffic allowed in and out of the campus
network on a port-by-port basis. The current firewall configuration allows only
incoming access to the campus for specific subnets and servers, and allows
outbound traffic only on specified ports for most of the campus.
The firewall configuration and implementation addresses most
vulnerability concerns detailed by this research when considering attacks from
outside the campus. This results from the traffic being blocked because of a
firewall access rule or parameter, thereby limiting the avenues into the ETSU
network from outside campus. However, this still leaves certain ports open and
available for avenues of attack (e.g., HTTP port 80, and some internally
originated traffic based vulnerabilities). This also leaves a host of viable attack
avenues for malicious users inside the campus firewall, who can footprint all
ports and services on campus to create their own vulnerability exploit list.
Because of the limitations of the current implementation of the campus firewall,
continued vulnerability assessment sweeps, similar to those detailed in this
document, are suggested for the ETSU computer network.
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APPENDIX A: TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

*A*
Availability:

The amount of time a computer system or network is
available for normal business use. Availability is very
important in interpreting the total cost of ownership of a
security model.

*B*
Banner
Enumeration:
Banner
Recognition:

The process of sweeping a port range looking for service
banners.
The process of parsing a service banner to retrieve
application version or patch level information.

Black Box:

A vulnerability assessment strategy where the test team has
no knowledge of the underlying network infrastructure.

Blog:

Web log or binary log. An online journal.

*C*
CHARGEN:

A UNIX utility that sends random characters over a network.

CGI:

Common Gateway Interface – A specification that allows a
server-side executable to accept and manipulate data given
from a web page.

Crystal Box:

A vulnerability assessment strategy where the test team has
some knowledge of the underlying network infrastructure.

*D*
Day-0:

The time between a vulnerability being discovered and a fix
being released.
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DDoS:

Defense-inDepth:

Distributed Denial of Service (attack) – an attack launched
by multiple computers against a host that blocks a large
percentage of legitimate network traffic from entering the
host network or system.
A security strategy using multiple layers or types of “security
solutions”.

DHCP:

Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol – a protocol used for
automatically assigning dynamic IP addresses to network
clients.

DoS:

Denial of Service – an attack launched by a single computer
against a host that causes a failure in the host that denies
services.

*E*
Echo:

A utility used to display a line of text on a screen.

Eggdrop:

An open-source IRC robot.

Enumeration:

The characterization of a computer or network level
accounts and open shares, via probes of said system(s).

ETSU:

East Tennessee State University - a regional university located
in Johnson City, Tennessee.

*F*
Firewall:

A hardware or software boundary between connecting
networks. Typically used to filter incoming packets based on
specific rule sets.

Footprint:

An attempt to profile an organization’s network security
structure. The increased knowledge is generally used for
attempted intrusion.

Finger:

A utility used to retrieve information about a remote user.

57

FTP:

File Transfer Protocol, a method of transmitting files from one
computer to another.

*H*
HTML:

HyperText Markup Language, a computer language used to
create world wide web pages.

HTTP:

HyperText Transfer Protocol, the protocol used by the World
Wide Web for transferring data between web servers and
web browsers.

*I*
IRC:

Internet Relay Chat – an online system used for
communications and file transfer.

IP:

Internet Protocol – a connectionless protocol used to deliver
packets of information between two, or more, systems on a
network. Paired with the Transport Control Protocol to create
TCP/IP, the main protocol used on the Internet and local area
networks.

*L*
LAN:

Local Area Network -- A data communications network
confined to a limited geographic area with moderate to high
data rates. The area served may consist of a single building
or a cluster of buildings. It is owned by its user, and does not
use common carrier circuits. LANs may have gateways or
bridges to other public or private networks.

*N*
Nessus:
Nessus
Attack
Scripting
Language:

A freeware UNIX tool that scans systems on a network to
discover “well-known” security vulnerabilities.

A scripting language developed for the Nessus vulnerability
scanner.
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NetBIOS:

Network Basic Input/Output System. A network API
developed by IBM and Sytek.

Nmap:

A freeware UNIX tool that determines open ports within a
network protocol stack.

*O*
OIT:

Office of Information Technology.

*P*
Packet:

A group of bits, including information bits and overhead bits,
transmitted as a complete package on a packet-switched
network. Usually smaller than a transmission block.

Password:

A secret code known by the computer system for a specific
user or program. Passwords are used for authentication, not
authorization.

Physical
Security:

An application of physical barriers or control procedures to
protect information systems.

Plug-in:

A small piece of software that enriches a larger piece of
software by adding additional functionality.

Port:

A computer interface used for communicating with a remote
terminal.

Protocol:

A set of methods or procedures that govern the transmission
of data.

Protocol
Analyzer:

An application used to passively monitor traffic on a network.

*R*
Red Hat Linux:

A Linux distribution Operating System.

Remote Access:

The act of connecting to a network by remote means.
Usually performed via telephone lines or the Internet.
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Rootkit:

A collection of trojaned processes and scripts that automate
common hacker actions performed after successfully
compromising a system.

Router:

A protocol specific device that passes data between LANs by
examining the data and selecting the cheapest, fastest, or
least busy of all available routes. It functions at the network
layer of the OSI model.

* S*
Script Kiddie:

A hacker who lacks the skill to unleash an attack of his or her
own and thus uses prewritten scripts to perform the attack.

SMB:

Server Message Block. A Microsoft protocol developed to
enable file and print sharing on a network.

Sniffing:

The act of monitoring or recording packet traffic across a
network for later review. Usually used to acquire login
information, or as a maintenance or diagnostic tool for
administrators.

Subnet:

A portion of a network distinguished by a number or range of
addresses.

*T*
TCP:

Transport Control Protocol – a connection-based protocol
that enables two system to communicate with streams of
information. Paired with the Internet Protocol to create
TCP/IP, the main protocol used on the Internet and local area
networks.

Telnet:

A program/protocol used to connect and interact with a
remote host to perform operations as if the remote host were
local.

Trojan Horse:

A program that, when activated, has unexpected side
effects. These side effects are usually masked or otherwise
hidden from the user such as opening backdoors into the
associated computer or attached network.

*U*
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UDP:

User Datagram Protocol – a connectionless protocol used
mainly in broadcast delivery of packets.

*V*
Virtual Security:

The task of securing information stored in, transmitted through
or accessed by a computer using on-line commands

Virus:

A computer application that has self replicating code or
characteristics. Virii are generally thought of as being
disruptive, although many widely accepted applications
exhibit this attribute.

Vulnerability:

A flaw in a program’s configuration or logic that allows an
attacker to receive escalated privileges, disable application
or service operation or compromise computer data

Vulnerability
Remediation:

The processes involved when patching a known vulnerability.
This can include, but is not limited to file permission
modification, policy creation or modification, installing a
patch or hot fix.

*W*
Worm:

A computer application that replicates itself until it uses all
available resources of a computer or network. A worm differs
from a virus in that a worm is not embedded in another
application.

*Z*
Zombie:

A PC which has been previously compromised and is now
under the control of a hacker. Used in tandem with other
zombies to deploy a Distributed Denial of Service style attack.
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APPENDIX B: CREATED SOURCE CODES

Nessus CLI Respawner (Shell script)

This shell script was used to automate campus sweeps by allowing a Nessus
configuration file and host list be specified on the command line with the rest of
the batch scan information. It creates a status output file which can be
accessed in real time to determine the point of the sweep it is currently in.
#!/bin/bsh
#thesisScanner script to automate campus sweep with a predefined config file.
#input – campusNets (text file of campus subnet ranges to scan, <cr> limited)
#input -- .nessusAll (nessus config file to scan with)
#output – progress (text file with text progress indicators)
#variable declarations
nessConf='/root/thesis/ness_cmd/.nessusAll'
numNessTargets=$(wc –l /root/thesis/ness_cmd/campusNets)
strTarget='nothing'
strFilename='nothing'
numIterator=1
echo 'STARTING SWEEP' > progress
$SUDO killall nessusd
$SUDO killall nessus
$SUDO /usr/local/sbin/nessusd -D
#recursion for the target file ...
until test $numIterator -ge $numNessTargets; do
$(head -n $numIterator campusNets | tail -n 1 > targetFile) strTarget=$(head –n
$numIterator campusNets | tail -n 1)
echo 'Scanning Target:' $(cat targetFile) '(pass:'$numIterator')'
echo 'Scanning Target:' $(cat targetFile) '(pass:'$numIterator')' >> progress
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strFilename=$(head -c 10 targetFile)
#scan the target subnet here
nessus -c $nessConf -T nsr -q localhost 1241 root [PASSWORD] targetFile
$strFilename.nsr
#kill all nessus & nessusd processes (memory cleanup hopefully)
echo 'Killing all nessus clients and daemons ...'
echo 'Killing all nessus clients and daemons ...' >> progress
$SUDO killall nessusd $SUDO killall nessus
echo 'Finished killing all nessus clients and daemons.'
#restart nessus daemon for next pass
echo 'Restarting Nessus Daemon ...'
echo 'Restarting Nessus Daemon ...' >> progress
$SUDO /usr/local/sbin/nessusd -D
echo 'Nessus Daemon Restarted.'
let numIterator=numIterator+1
done
$SUDO killall nessusd
$SUDO killall nessus
echo 'thesisScanner.sh sweep is complete!' >> progress
$SUDO service sendmail start
cat progress | mail –s “thesisScanner complete” zwrs2@imail.etsu.edu
$SUDO service sendmail stop
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Nessus Log Parser (VB6 and VBA)

This VB6 and VBA embedded Excel application is used to parse raw Nessus .nsr
vulnerability information files and create a vulnerability matrix of hosts. It
decreases the vulnerability data review time required after a successful
vulnerability sweep.
'frmTest Form
Option Explicit
Private objNessus As prjNessus.clsNessus
Private Sub cmdProcess_Click()
'
' OK
' You have to set the delimiter and the filename to decode before calling
the decode method
' (crashes gracefully if you don't)
'
objNessus.Delimter = "|"
objNessus.FileName = VerifyFile("123", Me)
objNessus.DecodeFile
End Sub
Private Sub Form_Load()
Set objNessus = New prjNessus.clsNessus
End Sub
Private Sub Form_Terminate()
'
' *** Be sure and do this
'
Set objNessus = Nothing
End Sub
'--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Public Function VerifyFile(str As String, frm As Form) As String
'=============================================================
' Module1.VerifyFile
'------------------------------------------------------------' Purpose : Verifys that file exist, if not, it display of
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'
dialog box to let the user find the file.
' Notes :
'------------------------------------------------------------' Parameters
'----------' str As String - File name to verify
' frm as From - Form procedure is called from (use Me)
'------------------------------------------------------------' Returns:
' String - File name and path of new file to be opened
'------------------------------------------------------------' Revision History
' 11/25/2000 - Added error checking to take care of user
'
selecting the cancel button
'------------------------------------------------------------'=============================================================
' End Code Header block
On Error GoTo ErrorHandler
If Dir(str) = "" Then
'
' *** File does not exist
'
'----------------frm.dlgCommon.CancelError = True
frm.dlgCommon.FileName = ""
frm.dlgCommon.Filter = "Nessus Files (*.nsr)|*.nsr|All Files (*.*)|*.*"
frm.dlgCommon.InitDir = App.Path
frm.dlgCommon.ShowOpen
VerifyFile = frm.dlgCommon.FileName
Else
'
' *** If file does exist
'
VerifyFile = str
End If
Exit Function
ErrorHandler:
'
' *** Error 32755 occurs when cancel is selected from the dialog box
'
If Err.Number = 32755 Then
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MsgBox "No File was selected, the application will now close", vbOKOnly +
vbExclamation, "File required"
'
End
' Else
'
DisplayError
End If
End Function
'clsNessus Class
Option Explicit
Private strDelim As String
Private intKeys As Integer
Private strFileName As String
Private Const conErrNoDelim As String = "No delimiter has been set, must set
obj.Delimiter"
Private Const conErrNoDelimNumber As Integer = 2000
Private Const conErrNoDelimSource = "prjNessus.clsNessus: Delimiter Property"
Private Const conErrNoFile As String = "No Filename was given to decode."
Private Const conErrNoFileNumber As Integer = 2001
Private Const conErrNoFileSource As String = "obj.FileName"
Dim objExcel As New Excel.Application
Dim objBook As Excel.Workbook
Dim objSheet As Excel.Worksheet
Dim objSheet2 As Excel.Worksheet
Public Sub DecodeFile()
Dim objFile As New Scripting.FileSystemObject
Dim fsStream As Scripting.TextStream
Dim strLine As Variant
Dim strReadLine As String
Dim intX As Integer
Dim strKeys As Variant
Dim intRow As Integer
Set objBook = objExcel.Workbooks.Add
Set objSheet = objBook.Worksheets.Add
' Set objBook = GetObject(App.Path & "\original.xls")
Set objSheet2 = objBook.Worksheets.Add
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objSheet2.Name = "Nessus Info " & Format(Date, "dddd.mmm d yyyy")
objSheet.Name = "Data Dump"
On Error GoTo ErrHandler
If strDelim = vbNullString Then Err.Raise vbObjectError + conErrNoDelimNumber,
conErrNoDelimSource, conErrNoDelim
If strFileName = vbNullString Then Err.Raise vbObjectError +
conErrNoFileNumber, conErrNoFileSource, conErrNoFile
Set fsStream = objFile.OpenTextFile(strFileName)
''' check for no keys number
intRow = 3
objSheet2.Cells(1, 1) = "Nessus ID"
objSheet2.Cells(1, 2) = "Name"
objSheet2.Cells(1, 3) = "Family"
objSheet2.Cells(1, 4) = "Summary"
objSheet2.Cells(1, 5) = "Port(s)"
objSheet2.Cells(1, 6) = Date
objSheet2.Cells.Font.Bold = True
objSheet2.Cells.Font.Color = vbBlack
Dim intMax As Integer
Do
strReadLine = fsStream.ReadLine
strLine = Split(strReadLine, strDelim)
intMax = NumOfReturnValues(strReadLine)
If 2 <= intMax Then objSheet2.Cells(intRow, 1) = strLine(2)
If 0 <= intMax Then
objSheet2.Cells(intRow, 2) = strLine(0)
If 2 <= intMax Then objSheet2.Hyperlinks.Add objSheet2.Cells(intRow, 2),
"http://cgi.nessus.org/plugins/dump.php3?id=" & strLine(2)
End If
If 3 <= intMax Then
objSheet2.Cells(intRow, 3) = strLine(3)
objSheet2.Hyperlinks.Add objSheet2.Cells(intRow, 3),
"http://cgi.nessus.org/plugins/dump.php3?family=" & strLine(3)
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End If
If 4 <= intMax Then objSheet2.Cells(intRow, 4) = strLine(4)
If 5 <= intMax Then objSheet2.Cells(intRow, 5) = strLine(5)
For intX = 0 To NumOfReturnValues(strReadLine)
'Debug.Print strLine(intX)
objSheet.Cells(intRow, intX + 1) = strLine(intX)
'objSheet2.Cells(intRow, intX + 1) = strLine(intX)
Next intX
'

Debug.Print "---------"
'
' *** Parse line
'
' 0 = Host
' 1 = Port
' 2 = Nessus ID
' 3 = Family (type)
' 4 = Summary
intRow = intRow + 1
Loop While Not fsStream.AtEndOfStream
objSheet2.Columns.AutoFit
objSheet.Columns.AutoFit
objExcel.Visible = True

Exit Sub
ErrHandler:
MsgBox Err.Number & vbNewLine & Err.Description & vbNewLine & "Source: " &
Err.Source, vbCritical, Err.Source
End Sub
Public Function NumOfReturnValues(strData As String) As Integer
Dim intCount As Integer
Dim intVal As Integer
intVal = 1
Do Until intVal = 0
intVal = InStr(intVal + 1, strData, strDelim, vbBinaryCompare)
intCount = intCount + 1
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Loop
NumOfReturnValues = intCount - 1
End Function
'
' *** Set delimiter for parser
'
Public Property Let Delimter(ByVal strDelimiter As String)
strDelim = strDelimiter
End Property
'
' *** Set filename to decode
'
Public Property Let FileName(ByVal strNewFileName As String)
strFileName = strNewFileName
End Property
Private Sub Class_Terminate()
Set objSheet = Nothing
Set objSheet2 = Nothing
Set objBook = Nothing
Set objExcel = Nothing
End Sub
'------------------------------------------------------------------'-------------------------- SET Nessus URL ------------------------'------------------------------------------------------------------' Programmer:
Rick Simons
' E-mail address: zwrs2@imail.etsu.edu
' Creation date:
5/23/02
' Date of last mod: 9/17/02
'------------------------------------------------------------------'------------------------------------------------------------------' Purpose:
'------------------------------------------------------------------'------------------------------------------------------------------' Notes:
'------------------------------------------------------------------'------------------------------------------------------------------Option Explicit
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Public Function setNessusURL()
Dim astrURL As String
Dim astrNessusID As String
Dim astrIsLastRow As String
Dim aLAST_COLUMN As String
Dim aFIRST_COLUMN As String
Dim acolumn As String
Dim r As Integer
aFIRST_COLUMN = "C"
aLAST_COLUMN = "Y"
acolumn = "C"
Dim start As Integer
start = 64
For r = 1 To 30
astrURL = "http://cgi.nessus.org/plugins/dump.php3?id="
astrNessusID = (Range(acolumn & 4).Value)
With Worksheets(1)
Hyperlinks.Add Anchor:=.Range(acolumn & 4), _
Address:=astrURL & astrNessusID, _
TextToDisplay:=astrNessusID
End With
‘these nested ifs are nasty, but I don’t have time to write a clean
‘ function atm, need to cleanup later
If acolumn = "X" Then acolumn = "Y"
If acolumn = "W" Then acolumn = "X"
If acolumn = "V" Then acolumn = "W"
If acolumn = "U" Then acolumn = "V"
If acolumn = "T" Then acolumn = "U"
If acolumn = "S" Then acolumn = "T"
If acolumn = "R" Then acolumn = "S"
If acolumn = "Q" Then acolumn = "R"
If acolumn = "P" Then acolumn = "Q"
If acolumn = "O" Then acolumn = "P"
If acolumn = "N" Then acolumn = "O"
If acolumn = "M" Then acolumn = "N"
If acolumn = "L" Then acolumn = "M"
If acolumn = "K" Then acolumn = "L"
If acolumn = "J" Then acolumn = "K"
If acolumn = "I" Then acolumn = "J"
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If acolumn = "H" Then acolumn = "I"
If acolumn = "G" Then acolumn = "H"
If acolumn = "F" Then acolumn = "G"
If acolumn = "E" Then acolumn = "F"
If acolumn = "D" Then acolumn = "E"
If acolumn = "C" Then acolumn = "D"
Next
End Function
'------------------------------------------------------------------'-------------------------- SET Nessus IDs ------------------------'------------------------------------------------------------------' Programmer:
Rick Simons
' E-mail address: zwrs2@imail.etsu.edu
' Creation date:
5/23/02
' Date of last mod: 9/17/02
'------------------------------------------------------------------'------------------------------------------------------------------' Purpose:
'------------------------------------------------------------------'------------------------------------------------------------------' Notes:
'------------------------------------------------------------------'------------------------------------------------------------------Option Explicit
Public Sub setNessusIDS()
Dim MAX_ROWS As Integer ' for the max rows in the sheet
(ROGERSTOUT."Nessus Info")
Dim LAST_ROW As Integer
Dim r As Integer
' these are iterators for parsing the document fully
Dim strURL As String
Dim strNessusID As String
Dim strIsLastRow As String
MAX_ROWS = 1096
' current nessusID max is 1095 on 9.17.02, need to
make this global
LAST_ROW = 1096
For r = 2 To LAST_ROW
strURL = Range("b" & r).Hyperlinks(1).Name
strNessusID = Right(strURL, 5)
Range("a" & r).Value = strNessusID
Next
End Sub
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Remote TCP Service Monitor (VB6)

This application is used to remotely monitor TCP based servers and notify support
personnel if the server fails.
'------------------------------------------------------------------'---------------------------- Service Mon -------------------------'------------------------------------------------------------------' Programmers: Rick Simons
' Creation Date: 11.30.03
Last Mod: 12.13.03
'------------------------------------------------------------------' Purpose: To effectively monitor TCP services like FTP, SSH,
'
Telnet, HTTP, HTTPS, MS-SQL, MS-MsgQueue, etc.
'------------------------------------------------------------------'
Notes: Base TCP connect code and logic was ripped from
'
HotMon 1.0 found @
'
http://www.planetsourcecode.com/
'
vb/scripts/ShowCode.asp?txtCodeId=9057&lngWId=1
'
'
The email notify junk was based on a smtp/rfc
'
spec review and is kinda nasty. Canned email
'
object from MSN doesn’t handle relay very well,
'
so this is very raw command driven MTA/MX.
'------------------------------------------------------------------'
ToDo: Need to add the following functionality when
'
time permits:
'
'
GUI: Add/Edit/Delete host/port to monitor
'
'
Logic: Add DNS resolution for IP based hosts
'
Logic: Add additional error handling
'
- DNS resolution failure
'
- additional TCP handshake cases (RFC)
'
- error on email/sql/log
'
'
Proj: Convert to .NET
'
Proj: Convert to service
'------------------------------------------------------------------Option Explicit
72

Dim sIPAddress As String
Dim sLastState As String
Dim sSubj As String
Dim sBody As String
Dim sAppVersion As String
Dim sHost As String
Dim iPort As Integer
Dim iPortNumber As Integer
Dim iTimerIterator As Integer
Enum States
Start = -1
Connect
Helo
MailFrom
SendTo
Data
MessageData
EndMessage
Complete
End Enum
Dim State As States
Private Sub cmdOptions_Click()
frmOptions.Show
End Sub
Private Sub Form_Load()
sIPAddress = 0
iPortNumber = 1
sLastState = 2
sHost = frmOptions.txtEmailServer.Text
iPort = frmOptions.txtEmailPort.Text
sAppVersion = App.Major & "." & App.Minor & App.Revision
StatusBar1.Panels.Item(1).Text = "Service Mon v" & sAppVersion
'this cannot have spaces, per smtp rfc spec
frmOptions.txtEmailFrom.Text = "ServiceMon_v" & sAppVersion
grdStatus.ColAlignment(sIPAddress) = flexAlignLeftCenter
grdStatus.ColAlignment(sLastState) = flexAlignCenterCenter
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grdStatus.ColWidth(0) = 1875
grdStatus.ColWidth(1) = 600
grdStatus.ColWidth(2) = 1875
grdStatus.Row = 0
grdStatus.Col = 0
grdStatus.Text = "Host"
grdStatus.Col = 1
grdStatus.Text = "Port"
grdStatus.Col = 2
grdStatus.Text = "State"
grdStatus.SelectionMode = flexSelectionByRow
LoadConfig
End Sub
Private Sub cmdMonitor_Click()
cmdExit.Enabled = False
iTimerIterator = 1
If cmdMonitor.Caption = "&Monitor" Then
StatusBar1.Panels.Item(1).Text = "Monitoring Services ..."
StatusBar1.Panels.Item(2).Text = ""
'couldn't figure out how to overload timer obj to take a long, so
'hacked a nasty iterator to cause it to push monitor every blah iterations.
'60000 = 60 seconds...iterator mux is in frmOptions
Timer1.Interval = 60000
Timer1.Enabled = True
cmdMonitor.Caption = "&Stop"
LogEvent "Service Mon v" & sAppVersion & " Started."
Monitor
Else
Timer1.Enabled = False
cmdMonitor.Caption = "&Monitor"
StatusBar1.Panels.Item(1).Text = "Service Mon v" & App.Major & "." & App.Minor
& App.Revision
StatusBar1.Panels.Item(2).Text = ""
StatusBar1.Panels.Item(3).Text = ""
If grdStatus.Enabled = False Then
grdStatus.Enabled = True
Else
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'do nothing
End If
cmdExit.Enabled = True
cmdOptions.Enabled = True
End If
End Sub
'This is the Winsock monitoring code
Private Sub Monitor()
Dim RowPos As Integer
Dim sService As String
Dim sTemp As String
grdStatus.Enabled = False
cmdOptions.Enabled = False
For RowPos = 1 To grdStatus.Rows - 1
If sckMonitor.State <> 0 Then
sckMonitor.Close
Else
'do nothing
End If
grdStatus.Col = sIPAddress
grdStatus.Row = RowPos
sckMonitor.RemoteHost = grdStatus.Text
grdStatus.Col = iPortNumber
sckMonitor.RemotePort = Val(grdStatus.Text)
sckMonitor.Connect
grdStatus.Col = sIPAddress
While sckMonitor.State = 4
DoEvents
If sckMonitor.State = 5 Then
'StatusBar1.Panels.Item(2).Text = "Resolved"
Else
'do nothing
End If
Wend
While sckMonitor.State = 6
'StatusBar1.Panels.Item(2).Text = "Connecting ..."
DoEvents
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Wend
Select Case sckMonitor.State
Case 0:
StatusBar1.Panels.Item(2).Text = "Closed"
Case 1:
grdStatus.Col = sLastState
grdStatus.Text = " UP! (1)"
grdStatus.Col = sIPAddress
'StatusBar1.Panels.Item(2).Text = "ALIVE! (1)"
Case 2:
'StatusBar1.Panels.Item(2).Text = "Listening"
Case 3:
'StatusBar1.Panels.Item(2).Text = "Pending"
Case 4:
'StatusBar1.Panels.Item(2).Text = "Resolving"
Case 5:
'StatusBar1.Panels.Item(2).Text = "Resolved"
Case 6:
'StatusBar1.Panels.Item(2).Text = "Connecting"
While sckMonitor.State = 6
DoEvents
Wend
Case 7:
grdStatus.Col = sLastState
grdStatus.Text = " UP! (7)"
grdStatus.Col = sIPAddress
'StatusBar1.Panels.Item(2).Text = "Connected"
'StatusBar1.Panels.Item(2).Text = "ALIVE! (7)"
Case 8:
StatusBar1.Panels.Item(2).Text = "Closing"
Case 9:
grdStatus.Col = sLastState
grdStatus.Text = "DOWN! (9)"
grdStatus.Col = sIPAddress
StatusBar1.Panels.Item(2).Text = grdStatus.Text & " DOWN! (9)"
grdStatus.Col = grdStatus.Col + 1
sTemp = grdStatus.Text
grdStatus.Col = grdStatus.Col - 1
LogEvent grdStatus.Text & " " & sTemp & " is DOWN! (9)"
sSubj = ""
sSubj = grdStatus.Text
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grdStatus.Col = grdStatus.Col + 1
'doing this for default port service associations. for monitoring a service
'running on a "defined" port,
'ToDo: need to hack this or write a banner recognition parser
Select Case grdStatus.Text
Case 21
sService = "FTP-21"
Case 22
sService = "SSH-22"
Case 23
sService = "TELNET-23"
Case 25
sService = "SMTP-25"
Case 79
sService = "FINGER-79"
Case 80
sService = "HTTP-80"
Case 443
sService = "HTTPS-443"
Case 444
sService = "HTTPS-444"
Case 1241
sService = “NESSUSD-1241”
Case 1433
sService = "MS SQL-1433"
Case 1801
sService = "MS MESSENGING QUEUE-1801"
Case 2601
sService = "RS RDP-2601"
Case 3389
sService = "MS TERM SERV/RD-3389"
Case 5901 - 5909
sService = "VNC SERVER-5901-09"
Case Else
sService = grdStatus.Text
End Select
sSubj = sSubj & " " & sService & " Service Down."
grdStatus.Col = grdStatus.Col - 1
Notify
End Select
77

sckMonitor.Close
Next
grdStatus.Enabled = True
End Sub
Private Sub cmdExit_Click()
If sckMonitor.State <> 0 Then
sckMonitor.Close
End
Else
'do nothing
End If
If sckNotify.State <> 0 Then
sckNotify.Close
Else
'do nothing
End If
Unload frmOptions
Unload Me
End Sub
'On Unload, make sure winsock connections are closed
Private Sub Form_Unload(Cancel As Integer)
If sckMonitor.State <> 0 Then
sckMonitor.Close
End
Else
'do nothing
End If
If sckNotify.State <> 0 Then
sckNotify.Close
Else
'do nothing
End If
End Sub
'On Terminate, make sure winsock connections are closed
Private Sub Form_Terminate()
If sckMonitor.State <> 0 Then
sckMonitor.Close
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End
Else
'do nothing
End If
If sckNotify.State <> 0 Then
sckNotify.Close
Else
'do nothing
End If
End Sub
'Timer event spawn of monitoring
Private Sub Timer1_Timer()
iTimerIterator = iTimerIterator + 1
If iTimerIterator Mod frmOptions.txtServiceCheckInterval.Text = 0 Then
Monitor
iTimerIterator = 0
Else
'do nothing
End If
End Sub
Private Sub LoadConfig()
Dim IpAddress As String
Dim PortNum As String
Dim RowAdded As Integer
On Error GoTo ErrorH
Open "ServiceMonEntries.ini" For Input As #1
While Not EOF(1)
Input #1, IpAddress, PortNum
grdStatus.Row = 1
If grdStatus.Text = "" Then
grdStatus.Col = sIPAddress
grdStatus.Text = IpAddress
grdStatus.Col = 1
grdStatus.Text = PortNum
Else
grdStatus.AddItem IpAddress
RowAdded = grdStatus.Rows - 1
grdStatus.Row = RowAdded
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grdStatus.Col = iPortNumber
grdStatus.Text = PortNum
End If
Wend
Close #1
Exit Sub
ErrorH:
LogEvent "Service Monitor Configuration Load Error"
End Sub
'Log event to log
Public Sub LogEvent(sWhatHappened As String)
Dim sWhatToPrint As String
On Error GoTo ErrorH
Open "ServiceMonLog.txt" For Append As #500
sWhatToPrint = Date & "|" & Time & "|" & sWhatHappened
Print #500, sWhatToPrint
Close #500
Exit Sub
ErrorH:
Open "ServiceMonLog.txt" For Input As #500
Resume Next
End Sub
Public Sub Notify()
State = Start
sckNotify.Protocol = sckTCPProtocol
sckNotify.RemoteHost = sHost
sckNotify.RemotePort = iPort
sckNotify.Connect
End Sub
Public Sub sckNotify_Connect()
State = Connect
End Sub
Public Sub sckNotify_DataArrival(ByVal bytesTotal As Long)
Dim sMessage As String
Dim sResponse As String
Dim sTo As String
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Dim sFrom As String
sTo = frmOptions.txtEmailTo.Text
sFrom = frmOptions.txtEmailFrom.Text
Select Case State
Case Connect
sckNotify.GetData sResponse, vbString
If IsValid(sResponse, "220") Then
State = State + 1
sMessage = "HELO <" & sHost & ">" & vbCrLf
sckNotify.SendData (sMessage)
Else
sckNotify.Close
State = Start
Exit Sub
End If
Case Helo
sckNotify.GetData sResponse, vbString
If IsValid(sResponse, "250") Then
State = State + 1
sMessage = "MAIL FROM:<" & sFrom & ">" & vbCrLf
sckNotify.SendData (sMessage)
Else
sckNotify.Close
State = Start
Exit Sub
End If
Case MailFrom
sckNotify.GetData sResponse, vbString
If IsValid(sResponse, "250") Or IsValid(sResponse, "251") Then
State = State + 1
sMessage = "RCPT TO:<" & sTo & ">" & vbCrLf
sckNotify.SendData (sMessage)
Else
sckNotify.Close
State = Start
Exit Sub
End If
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Case SendTo
sckNotify.GetData sResponse, vbString
'
'
If IsValid(sResponse, "250") Then
State = State + 1
sMessage = "DATA" & vbCrLf
sckNotify.SendData (sMessage)
Else
sckNotify.Close
State = Start
Exit Sub
End If
Case Data
sckNotify.GetData sResponse, vbString
If IsValid(sResponse, "250") Or IsValid(sResponse, "354") Then
State = State + 1
sMessage = _
"To: " & sTo & vbNewLine & _
"From: " & sFrom & vbNewLine & _
"Subject: " & sSubj & vbNewLine & _
vbNewLine & _
sBody & vbCrLf & "." & vbCrLf
sckNotify.SendData (sMessage)
Else
sckNotify.Close
State = Start
Exit Sub
End If
Case MessageData
sckNotify.GetData sResponse, vbString
State = State + 1
sMessage = "QUIT" & vbCrLf
sckNotify.SendData (sMessage)
Case EndMessage
sckNotify.GetData sResponse, vbString
sckNotify.Close
State = Start
Exit Sub
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Case Else
sckNotify.Close
Exit Sub
End Select
End Sub
Public Function IsValid(sMsg As String, sExpected As String) As Boolean
Dim sKey As String
If Left(sMsg, 3) = sExpected Then
IsValid = True
Else
IsValid = False
End If
End Function
Public Sub sckNotify_Error(ByVal Number As Integer, Description As String, ByVal
Scode As Long, ByVal Source As String, ByVal HelpFile As String, ByVal
HelpContext As Long, CancelDisplay As Boolean)
sckNotify.Close
End Sub
'frmOptions
Private Sub chkAudible_Click()
If chkAudible.Value = True Then
txtAudibleLocation.Enabled = True
Else
txtAudibleLocation.Enabled = False
End If
If chkAudible.Value = False Then
txtAudibleLocation.Enabled = False
Else
txtAudibleLocation.Enabled = True
End If
End Sub
Private Sub chkSQL_Click()
If chkSQL.Value = True Then
Me.txtSQLDt.Enabled = True
Me.txtSQLHost.Enabled = True
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Me.txtSQLIssue.Enabled = True
Me.txtSQLDB.Enabled = True
Me.txtSQLPass.Enabled = True
Me.txtSQLServer.Enabled = True
Me.txtSQLUser.Enabled = True
Else
Me.txtSQLDt.Enabled = False
Me.txtSQLHost.Enabled = False
Me.txtSQLIssue.Enabled = False
Me.txtSQLDB.Enabled = False
Me.txtSQLPass.Enabled = False
Me.txtSQLServer.Enabled = False
Me.txtSQLUser.Enabled = False
End If
If chkSQL.Value = False Then
Me.txtSQLDt.Enabled = False
Me.txtSQLHost.Enabled = False
Me.txtSQLIssue.Enabled = False
Me.txtSQLDB.Enabled = False
Me.txtSQLPass.Enabled = False
Me.txtSQLServer.Enabled = False
Me.txtSQLUser.Enabled = False
Else
Me.txtSQLDt.Enabled = True
Me.txtSQLHost.Enabled = True
Me.txtSQLIssue.Enabled = True
Me.txtSQLDB.Enabled = True
Me.txtSQLPass.Enabled = True
Me.txtSQLServer.Enabled = True
Me.txtSQLUser.Enabled = True
End If
End Sub
Private Sub cmdExit_Click()
Unload Me
End Sub
Private Sub cmdSave_Click()
validateOptions
frmOptions.Hide
End Sub
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Private Sub Form_Load()
txtAudibleLocation.Enabled = False
txtTxtLocation.Enabled = False
txtSQLDt.Enabled = False
txtSQLHost.Enabled = False
txtSQLIssue.Enabled = False
txtSQLDB.Enabled = False
txtSQLPass.Enabled = False
txtSQLServer.Enabled = False
txtSQLUser.Enabled = False
End Sub
Private Sub validateOptions()
If IsNumeric(txtServiceCheckInterval.Text) Then
'ok, continue
Else
MsgBox ("Service Check Interval Must be Numeric, You Fool of a Took!")
'todo: throw exception
End If
End Sub
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File Modification Watcher (VB.NET)

This application monitors the localhost file system for file modification. It was
used in tracking down embedded services unrecognized by Nessus and Nmap.
Imports System.IO
Imports System.Diagnostics
Public Class Form1
Inherits System.Windows.Forms.Form
Public watchfolder As FileSystemWatcher
#Region " Windows Form Designer generated code "
Public Sub New()
MyBase.New()
'This call is required by the Windows Form Designer.
InitializeComponent()
'Add any initialization after the InitializeComponent() call
End Sub
'Form overrides dispose to clean up the component list.
Protected Overloads Overrides Sub Dispose(ByVal disposing As Boolean)
If disposing Then
If Not (components Is Nothing) Then
components.Dispose()
End If
End If
MyBase.Dispose(disposing)
End Sub
'Required by the Windows Form Designer
Private components As System.ComponentModel.IContainer
'NOTE: The following procedure is required by the Windows Form Designer
'It can be modified using the Windows Form Designer.
'Do not modify it using the code editor.
Friend WithEvents txtPath As System.Windows.Forms.TextBox
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Friend WithEvents btnStart As System.Windows.Forms.Button
Friend WithEvents btnStop As System.Windows.Forms.Button
Friend WithEvents txtStatus As System.Windows.Forms.TextBox
Friend WithEvents btnClear As System.Windows.Forms.Button
<System.Diagnostics.DebuggerStepThrough()> Private Sub
InitializeComponent()
Me.txtPath = New System.Windows.Forms.TextBox
Me.btnStart = New System.Windows.Forms.Button
Me.btnStop = New System.Windows.Forms.Button
Me.txtStatus = New System.Windows.Forms.TextBox
Me.btnClear = New System.Windows.Forms.Button
Me.SuspendLayout()
'
'txtPath
'
Me.txtPath.Location = New System.Drawing.Point(8, 16)
Me.txtPath.Name = "txtPath"
Me.txtPath.Size = New System.Drawing.Size(200, 20)
Me.txtPath.TabIndex = 0
Me.txtPath.Text = "C:\"
'
'btnStart
'
Me.btnStart.Location = New System.Drawing.Point(344, 16)
Me.btnStart.Name = "btnStart"
Me.btnStart.TabIndex = 1
Me.btnStart.Text = "Start"
'
'btnStop
'
Me.btnStop.Location = New System.Drawing.Point(448, 16)
Me.btnStop.Name = "btnStop"
Me.btnStop.TabIndex = 2
Me.btnStop.Text = "Stop"
'
'txtStatus
'
Me.txtStatus.Location = New System.Drawing.Point(8, 56)
Me.txtStatus.Multiline = True
Me.txtStatus.Name = "txtStatus"
Me.txtStatus.ReadOnly = True
Me.txtStatus.ScrollBars = System.Windows.Forms.ScrollBars.Both
Me.txtStatus.Size = New System.Drawing.Size(768, 368)
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Me.txtStatus.TabIndex = 3
Me.txtStatus.Text = ""
'
'btnClear
'
Me.btnClear.Location = New System.Drawing.Point(552, 16)
Me.btnClear.Name = "btnClear"
Me.btnClear.TabIndex = 4
Me.btnClear.Text = "Clear"
'
'Form1
'
Me.AutoScaleBaseSize = New System.Drawing.Size(5, 13)
Me.ClientSize = New System.Drawing.Size(792, 438)
Me.Controls.Add(Me.btnClear)
Me.Controls.Add(Me.txtStatus)
Me.Controls.Add(Me.btnStop)
Me.Controls.Add(Me.btnStart)
Me.Controls.Add(Me.txtPath)
Me.Name = "Form1"
Me.Text = "Drive Watcher"
Me.ResumeLayout(False)
End Sub
#End Region
'List of Notify Filters
'Attributes
(The attributes of the file or folder)
'CreationTime
(The time the file or folder was created)
'DirectoryName
(The name of the directory)
'FileName
(The name of the file)
'LastAccess
(The date the file or folder was last opened)
'LastWrite
(The date the file or folder last had anything written to it)
'Security
(The security settings of the file or folder)
'Size
(The size of the file or folder)
Private Sub btnStart_Click(ByVal sender As System.Object, ByVal e As
System.EventArgs) Handles btnStart.Click
watchfolder = New System.IO.FileSystemWatcher()
watchfolder.IncludeSubdirectories = True
'this is the path we want to monitor
watchfolder.Path = txtPath.Text
88

'Add a list of Filter we want to specify
'make sure you use OR for each Filter as we need to
'all of those
watchfolder.NotifyFilter = IO.NotifyFilters.DirectoryName
watchfolder.NotifyFilter = watchfolder.NotifyFilter Or _
IO.NotifyFilters.FileName
watchfolder.NotifyFilter = watchfolder.NotifyFilter Or _
IO.NotifyFilters.Attributes
' add the handler to each event
AddHandler watchfolder.Changed, AddressOf logchange
AddHandler watchfolder.Created, AddressOf logchange
AddHandler watchfolder.Deleted, AddressOf logchange
' add the rename handler as the signature is different
AddHandler watchfolder.Renamed, AddressOf logrename
'Set this property to true to start watching
watchfolder.EnableRaisingEvents = True
btnStart.Enabled = False
btnStop.Enabled = True
'End of code for btn_start_click
End Sub
Private Sub logchange(ByVal source As Object, ByVal e As _
System.IO.FileSystemEventArgs)
'filter some stupid ones here
'ToDo: Do this the right way.
Dim strDontDisplay As String
'lstDontDisplay.Text = "C:\documents and settings\rick\ntuser.dat.log"
'lstDontDisplay.Text = "C:\windows\system32\config\software.log"
'lstDontDisplay.Text = "C:\documents and settings\rick\ntuser.dat"
strDontDisplay = "C:\documents and settings\rick\ntuser.dat.log"
strDontDisplay = "C:\windows\system32\config\software.log"
strDontDisplay = "C:\documents and settings\rick\ntuser.dat"
If e.ChangeType = IO.WatcherChangeTypes.Changed Then
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If e.FullPath <> strDontDisplay Then
txtStatus.Text &= e.FullPath & _
" modified" & vbCrLf
End If
End If
If e.ChangeType = IO.WatcherChangeTypes.Created Then
txtStatus.Text &= e.FullPath & _
" created" & vbCrLf
End If
If e.ChangeType = IO.WatcherChangeTypes.Deleted Then
txtStatus.Text &= e.FullPath & _
" deleted" & vbCrLf
End If
End Sub
Public Sub logrename(ByVal source As Object, ByVal e As _
System.IO.RenamedEventArgs)
txtStatus.Text &= e.OldName & _
" renamed to " & e.Name & vbCrLf
End Sub
Private Sub btnStop_Click(ByVal sender As System.Object, ByVal e As
System.EventArgs) Handles btnStop.Click
' Stop watching the folder
watchfolder.EnableRaisingEvents = False
btnStart.Enabled = True
btnStop.Enabled = False
End Sub
Private Sub btnClear_Click(ByVal sender As System.Object, ByVal e As
System.EventArgs) Handles btnClear.Click
txtStatus.Clear()
End Sub
End Class
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Script Based Vulnerability Scanners

During the first few months of this thesis project, when Nessus appeared as
though it might not complete the scans in time (scans were taking over a month
to complete), I started working on developing my own subset of vulnerability
scanners. These were not needed in the long run, but I include them here as
they are still a very simple and fast way to scan a network for specific IIS, Nimda,
anonymous FTP and open port vulnerabilities.
IIS /admin Available

#!/bin/bsh
#script to automate sweeps for http://address/$vulnString
#variable declarations
chrDot='.'
intTarget1Octet='151'
intTarget2Octet='141'
intTarget3Octet='8'
intTarget4Octet='1'
strTarget='nothing'
vulnString='/admin'
strOutputFile='admin'
echo 'STARTING' $vulnString ' SWEEP' > $strOutputFile
#recursion intTarget1Octet.intTarget2Octet.1-149.1-254
until test $intTarget3Octet -ge 150; do
#recursion intTarget1Octet.intTarget2Octet.$intTarget3Octet.1-254
until test $intTarget4Octet -ge 255; do
ping -q -c 1 -s 1 -w 5
$intTarget1Octet$chrDot$intTarget2Octet$chrDot$intTarget3Octet$chrDot$intTa
rget4Octet
if test $? -eq 0; then
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echo 'Getting
http://'$intTarget1Octet$chrDot$intTarget2Octet$chrDot$intTarget3Octet$chrD
ot$intTarget4Octet$vulnString
wget -t 1 -T 1 -S --spider --force-html -a $strOutputFile
http://$intTarget1Octet$chrDot$intTarget2Octet$chrDot$intTarget3Octet$chrDo
t$intTarget4Octet$vulnString
else
echo $intTarget3Octet$chrDot$intTarget4Octet 'is not up.'
fi
let intTarget4Octet=intTarget4Octet+1
done
let intTarget4Octet=1
let intTarget3Octet=intTarget3Octet+1
done
echo $vulnString 'sweep is complete!' >> $strOutputFile
#gzip --best results
#$SUDO service sendmail start
#mail -s "WebScan Complete!" zwrs2@imail.etsu.edu
#$SUDO service sendmail stop

Default Port Anonymous Enabled FTP

#!/bin/bsh
#script to automate sweeps for ftp://$strUser@address
#variable declarations
chrDot='.'
chrAt='@'
strUser='Anonymous'
strPasswd='rick@inter.net'
intTarget1Octet='151'
intTarget2Octet='141'
intTarget3Octet='8'
intTarget4Octet='1'
strTarget='nothing'
#vulnString='/admin'
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strOutputFile='AnonymousFTP'
echo 'STARTING' $strUser' FTP SWEEP' > $strOutputFile
#recursion intTarget1Octet.intTarget2Octet.1-149.1-254
until test $intTarget3Octet -ge 150; do
#recursion intTarget1Octet.intTarget2Octet.$intTarget3Octet.1-254
until test $intTarget4Octet -ge 255; do
ping -q -c 1 -s 1 -w 5
$intTarget1Octet$chrDot$intTarget2Octet$chrDot$intTarget3Octet$chrDot$intTa
rget4Octet
if test $? -eq 0; then
echo 'Getting
ftp://'$strUser$chrAt$intTarget1Octet$chrDot$intTarget2Octet$chrDot$intTarget3
Octet$chrDot$intTarget4Octet
wget -t 1 -T 1 -S -a $strOutputFile
ftp://$strUser$chrAt$intTarget1Octet$chrDot$intTarget2Octet$chrDot$intTarget3
Octet$chrDot$intTarget4Octet
else
echo $intTarget3Octet$chrDot$intTarget4Octet 'is not available.'
fi
let intTarget4Octet=intTarget4Octet+1
done
let intTarget4Octet=1
let intTarget3Octet=intTarget3Octet+1
done
echo $strUser 'FTP sweep is complete!' >> $strOutputFile
#gzip --best results
#$SUDO service sendmail start
#mail -s "WebScan Complete!" zwrs2@imail.etsu.edu
#$SUDO service sendmail stop

Full Port Sweep Anonymous Enabled

#!/bin/bsh
93

#script to automate sweeps for ftp://$strUser@address
#variable declarations
chrDot='.'
chrAt='@'
strUser='Anonymous'
strPasswd='rick@inter.net'
intPort='1'
intTarget1Octet='151'
intTarget2Octet='141'
intTarget3Octet='8'
intTarget4Octet='1'
strTarget='nothing'
#vulnString='/admin'
strOutputFile='AnonymousFTP_fullPortSweep'
echo 'STARTING' $strUser' FTP SWEEP' > $strOutputFile
#recursion intTarget1Octet.intTarget2Octet.1-149.1-254
until test $intTarget3Octet -ge 150; do
#recursion intTarget1Octet.intTarget2Octet.$intTarget3Octet.1-254
until test $intTarget4Octet -ge 255; do
ping -q -c 1 -s 1 -w 2
$intTarget1Octet$chrDot$intTarget2Octet$chrDot$intTarget3Octet$chrDot$intTa
rget4Octet > /dev/null
if test $? -eq 0; then
while [ $intPort -le 65535 ]
do
echo 'Getting
ftp://'$strUser$chrAt$intTarget1Octet$chrDot$intTarget2Octet$chrDot$intTarget3
Octet$chrDot$intTarget4Octet $intPort
#wget -t 1 -T 1 -S -a $strOutputFile
ftp://$strUser$chrAt$intTarget1Octet$chrDot$intTarget2Octet$chrDot$intTarget3
Octet$chrDot$intTarget4Octet $intPort
let intPort=intPort+1
done
else
echo $intTarget3Octet$chrDot$intTarget4Octet ' and all ports are not
available.'
fi
let intTarget4Octet=intTarget4Octet+1
done
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let intTarget4Octet=1
let intTarget3Octet=intTarget3Octet+1
done
echo $strUser 'Full FTP sweep is complete!' >> $strOutputFile
#gzip --best results
#$SUDO service sendmail start
#mail -s "WebScan Complete!" zwrs2@imail.etsu.edu
#$SUDO service sendmail stop

Nimda Vulnerability

With this sweep, the result file shows HTTP replies to the cmd.exe request, and
any infected host creates an index.html file displaying the contents of the
remote host C hard drive which allows the administrator performing the scan to
locate and patch said machine.
#!/bin/bsh
#script to automate sweeps for http://address/$vulnString
#variable declarations
chrDot='.'
intTarget1Octet='151'
intTarget2Octet='141'
intTarget3Octet='8'
intTarget4Octet='1'
strTarget='nothing'
vulnString='/scripts/..%252f../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir'
strOutputFile='nimda'
echo 'STARTING' $vulnString ' SWEEP' > $strOutputFile
#recursion intTarget1Octet.intTarget2Octet.1-149.1-254
until test $intTarget3Octet -ge 150; do
#recursion intTarget1Octet.intTarget2Octet.$intTarget3Octet.1-254
until test $intTarget4Octet -ge 255; do
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ping -q -c 1 -s 1 -w 5
$intTarget1Octet$chrDot$intTarget2Octet$chrDot$intTarget3Octet$chrDot$intTa
rget4Octet
if test $? -eq 0; then
echo 'Getting
https://'$intTarget1Octet$chrDot$intTarget2Octet$chrDot$intTarget3Octet$chrD
ot$intTarget4Octet$vulnString
wget -t 1 -T 1 -S --spider --force-html -a $strOutputFile
http://$intTarget1Octet$chrDot$intTarget2Octet$chrDot$intTarget3Octet$chrDo
t$intTarget4Octet$vulnString
else
echo $intTarget3Octet$chrDot$intTarget4Octet 'is not up.'
fi
let intTarget4Octet=intTarget4Octet+1
done
let intTarget4Octet=1
let intTarget3Octet=intTarget3Octet+1
done
echo $vulnString 'sweep is complete!' >> $strOutputFile
#gzip --best results
#$SUDO service sendmail start
#mail -s "WebScan Complete!" zwrs2@imail.etsu.edu
#$SUDO service sendmail stop
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Script Based Assistance Applications

Compression and Archival Script

This script was written to facilitate a quick backup and archival of all research
related materials. It also allowed work to be shared between my ETSU office
computer, and my home computer in a fairly easy and straight forward way.
#!/bin/bsh
thesisFilename=$(date -I)_bup.tar
echo 'Backing up nessus logs ...'
cp /usr/local/var/nessus/logs/* /root/thesis/logs/
echo 'Zipping nessus logs ...'
gzip --best /root/thesis/logs/*
echo 'Archiving root/thesis/* ...'
tar -cvf $thesisFilename /root/thesis/*
echo ''
echo 'Compressing archive ...'
gzip --best /root/scripts/$thesisFilename
echo 'Moving compressed archive to backup folder ...'
cp /root/scripts/$thesisFilename.gz /root/backups/
echo 'Removing temp files ...'
rm -f /root/scripts/$thesisFilename.gz
echo 'Backup script complete.'
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Localhost System Log Parser

#!bin/bash
sendTo='/root/info/logParsed'
mailTo='zwrs2@imail.etsu.edu'
date > $sendTo
date > /root/info/suDoers
date > /root/info/promisc
echo '**Promisc. Mode**' >> /root/info/promisc
cat /var/log/messages | grep promiscuous >> /root/info/promisc
echo '**SU Attempts**' >> /root/info/suDoers
cat /var/log/messages | grep ' su(pam' >> /root/info/suDoers
echo '**ACCEPTED LOGINS:**' >> /root/info/logParsed
cat /var/log/secure | grep 'Accepted password' >> /root/info/logParsed
echo '**FAILED LOGINS:**' >> /root/info/logParsed
cat /var/log/secure | grep 'Failed password for' >> /root/info/logParsed
cat /root/info/suDoers | mail $mailTo
cat $sendTo | mail -s 'Aeris Log Parser' $mailTo -c root

Root Crontab Cronjobs

######################################################
#
##
##
## Cronjobs for system maintenance and common tasks. ##
## Run in root crontab.
Cronjobs file v.02 ##
##
Last Updated 10.1.02 ##
######################################################
#
#

*** HOURLY ***
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#once an hour check and spawn nessusd if it isn't already
45 * * * * /usr/local/sbin/nessusd -D
#every thirty minutes check for new userIDs
4,34 * * * * sh /root/scripts/newLogins.sh
#
*** DAILY ***
#every morning at 3:35 up2date & 4:55 up2date packages
35 3 * * * up2date --force --update --install
55 4 * * * up2date --packages
#every morning update nessus plugins at 6:50
50 6 * * * /usr/local/sbin/nessus-update-plugins
#use rdate to timesync with online timeserver
10 7 * * * rdate -s time.uconn.edu > /dev/null
#
*** WEEKLY ***
#record memory info on M @ 330a
30 3 * * mon cat /proc/meminfo >> /root/info/mem
30 3 * * mon df -k >> /root/info/hdd
#update nessus on sunday morning
0 6 * * 0 sh ~/nessusCVS.sh
#backup /root/thesis info on monday morning
0 6 * * 1 sh /root/scripts/backup.sh
#
*** MONTHLY ***
#rebuild rpmdb first day of the month at 4
0 4 1 * * rpmdb –rebuilddb
#check for new rfcs the second of the month at 3
0 3 1 * * sh /root/RFCs/getRFCS
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Nessus Plugin Information Retriever

This script recursively checks the nessus.org web site for plugin background
information. It was useful for creating a master list of vulnerability number to
description matrix displayed in the VBA vulnerability matrix application.
#!/usr/freeware/bin/bash
#get all nessus plugin info pages
# v.002
let pluginNUM=10000
let maxPLUGIN=10999
let nine=10009
let ninetynine=10099
let nineninenine=10999
while [ $pluginNUM -le $maxPLUGIN ]
do
while [ $pluginNUM -le $nine ]
do
wget -c -t 0
http://cgi.nessus.org/plugins/dump.php3?id=$pluginNum
let pluginNUM=pluginNUM+1
done
while [ $pluginNUM -le $ninetynine ]
do
wget -c -t 0
http://cgi.nessus.org/plugins/dump.php3?id=$pluginNum
let pluginNUM=pluginNUM+1
done
while [ $pluginNUM -le $nineninenine ]
do
wget -c -t 0
http://cgi.nessus.org/plugins/dump.php3?id=$pluginNum
let pluginNUM=pluginNUM+1
done
while [ $pluginNUM -le $maxPLUGIN ]
do
wget -c -t 0
http://cgi.nessus.org/plugins/dump.php3?id=$pluginNum
let pluginNUM=pluginNUM+1
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done
let pluginNUM=pluginNUM+1
done

Red Hat New Login(s) Detector

This script was created to use the lastlog binary and monitor new users added to
the Red Hat system. It is a very low level security monitor, primarily created to
afford me an opportunity to learn more about shell scripting.
#!bin/bash
numNormal=1
#+ 1(root) for equal to
numLogins=$(lastlog | grep -v Never | grep -v Latest | grep -v root | wc -l)
sendTo='/root/info/lastlog'
mailTo='zwrs2@imail.etsu.edu'
if [ $numLogins -ge $numNormal ]
then
date > $sendTo
echo 'New Logins on Nessus2:' >> $sendTo
lastlog | grep -v Never | grep -v Latest >> $sendTo
cat $sendTo | mail -s 'Nessus2 New Login' $mailTo
fi

Red Hat ISO Downloader

During this research, I used this script to download new versions of Red Hat Linux
when they became available (7.2, 7.3, 8.0).
#!/usr/freeware/bin/bash
#get red hat 8.0
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#try from a gov mirror
wget -c -w 30 ftp://mirror.phy.bnl.gov/pub/redhatpub/redhat/linux/8.0/en/os/i386/md5sum
wget -c -w 30 --dot-style=mega ftp://mirror.phy.bnl.gov/pub/redhatpub/redhat/linux/8.0/en/os/i386/psyche-i386-disc1.iso
wget -c -w 30 --dot-style=mega ftp://mirror.phy.bnl.gov/pub/redhatpub/redhat/linux/8.0/en/os/i386/psyche-i386-disc2.iso
wget -c -w 30 --dot-style=mega ftp://mirror.phy.bnl.gov/pub/redhatpub/redhat/linux/8.0/en/os/i386/psyche-i386-disc3.iso
#try from edu mirror
wget -c -w 30 --dot-style=mega ftp://ftp.ece.cornell.edu/pub/linux/redhat/8.0en-iso/i386/md5sum
wget -c -w 30 --dot-style=mega ftp://ftp.ece.cornell.edu/pub/linux/redhat/8.0en-iso/i386/psyche-i386-disc1.iso
wget -c -w 30 --dot-style=mega ftp://ftp.ece.cornell.edu/pub/linux/redhat/8.0en-iso/i386/psyche-i386-disc2.iso
wget -c -w 30 --dot-style=mega ftp://ftp.ece.cornell.edu/pub/linux/redhat/8.0en-iso/i386/psyche-i386-disc3.iso
#try from red hat official
wget -c -w 45 --dot-style=mega
ftp://ftp.redhat.com/pub/redhat/linux/8.0/en/iso/i386/md5sum
wget -c -w 45 --dot-style=mega
ftp://ftp.redhat.com/pub/redhat/linux/8.0/en/iso/i386/psyche-i386-disc1.iso
wget -c -w 45 --dot-style=mega
ftp://ftp.redhat.com/pub/redhat/linux/8.0/en/iso/i386/psyche-i386-disc2.iso
wget -c -w 45 --dot-style=mega
ftp://ftp.redhat.com/pub/redhat/linux/8.0/en/iso/i386/psyche-i386-disc3.iso
md5sum * > rh80done
ls -l >> rh80done
echo 'RH80 Script Finished' >> rh80done
cat rh80done | mail zwrs2@imail.etsu.edu
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APPENDIX C: PUBLIC SOURCE CODES

Automatically Updating Nessus Plugins

This script was created by the Nessus community and automatically updates the
Nessus vulnerability plugins.
#!/bin/sh
# nessus-update-plugins
# This script will retrieve all the newest plugins from
# www.nessus.org.
#
# NOTE: the use of this script is dangerous as the authenticity of
#
the scripts is not checked for. USE THIS SCRIPT WITH CAUTION
#
# Author : Renaud Deraison <deraison@cvs.nessus.org>
# License : GPL (but for two lines of script, does it matter ?) #
#
# usage : nessus-update-plugins [-v]
#
# -r <name> : read a plugin name
# -v
: be verbose
# -vv
: be more verbose (debug)
# Proxy users
# If you are behind a proxy, you can set this options here
# or in ~/.nessus-update-pluginsrc
#
# If you edit THIS file, then the proxy (and proxy username/password)
# will be system-wide.
proxy_user=
proxy_passwd=
proxy=
# Examples :
# proxy_user="renaud"
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# proxy_passwd="topsecr3t"
# proxy="proxy.fr.nessus.org:8080"
# You can copy the lines above and put them
# in your ~/.nessus-update-pluginsrc
#-------------- DO NOT EDIT THIS FILE BEYOND THAT POINT ---------------------#
fetch_cmd="/usr/bin/wget -q -O -"
gzip=/bin/gzip
prefix=/usr/local
exec_prefix=${prefix}
bindir=${exec_prefix}/bin
sbindir=${exec_prefix}/sbin
libexecdir=${exec_prefix}/libexec
datadir=${prefix}/share
sysconfdir=${prefix}/etc
sharedstatedir=${prefix}/com
localstatedir=${prefix}/var
libdir=${exec_prefix}/lib
includedir=${prefix}/include
oldincludedir=/usr/include
infodir=${prefix}/info
mandir=${prefix}/man
pluginsdir="$libdir/nessus/plugins"
newdir=`cat $sysconfdir/nessus/nessusd.conf | grep plugins_folder | awk '{print
$3}'` test -n "$newdir" && pluginsdir="$newdir"
test -z "$fetch_cmd" && {
echo "\$fetch_cmd not set in $0 - aborting"
exit 1
}
fetchprogram=`echo $fetch_cmd | cut -d " " -f 1`
if [ -n "$fetchprogram" -a ! -x "$fetchprogram" ]
then
echo "The program '$fetchprogram' can not be found or executed"
echo "Please configure this script by changing the option"
echo "\$fetch_cmd or by installing $fetchprogram"
exit 1
fi
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# Read the configuration file, if any
#
test -f ~/.nessus-update-pluginsrc && . ~/.nessus-update-pluginsrc
help_screen()
{
echo "nessus-update-plugins 1.0.4, by Renaud Deraison
<deraison@cvs.nessus.org>" echo echo echo "Usage : nessus-update-plugins [v[v]] [-r name] [-h]" echo
echo "-v
: be verbose"
echo "-r <pluginname> : view the content of a plugin"
echo "-i <pluginname> : only install <pluginname>"
echo "-h
: this help screen"
echo
echo "Default action : update the nessusd plugins"
exit 0
}
view_plugin()
{
if [ -n "$fetch_cmd" ];
then
$fetch_cmd $proxyopts "http://www.nessus.org/nasl/$1"
fi
exit 0
}
install_plugin()
{
if [ -n "$fetch_cmd" ];
then
test -f "$pluginsdir/$1" && mv "$pluginsdir/$1" "$pluginsdir/$1.bak" $fetch_cmd
$proxyopts "http://www.nessus.org/nasl/$1" > "$libdir/nessus/plugins/$1" grep
"404 Not Found" "$pluginsdir/plugins/$1" 2>&1 > /dev/null && {
echo "Error - file not found"
rm -f "$pluginsdir/$1"
test -f "$pluginsdir/$1.bak" && mv "$pluginsdir/$1.bak" "$pluginsdir/$1"
}
# HUP nessusd
test -f ${prefix}/var/nessus/nessusd.pid && (
pid=`cat ${prefix}/var/nessus/nessusd.pid`
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kill -1 $pid 2>/dev/null
)
exit 0
else
echo "Error \$fetch_cmd or \$gzip are not set - abort"
exit 1
fi
}
proxyopts=""
echo "$fetch_cmd" | grep "lynx" 2>&1 > /dev/null &&
{
test -n "$proxy" && http_proxy="http://$proxy/"
test -n "$proxy_user" && proxyopts="-pauth=\"$proxy_user:$proxy_passwd\""
}
echo "$fetch_cmd" | grep "wget" 2>&1 > /dev/null &&
{
test -n "$proxy" && http_proxy="http://$proxy/"
test -n "$proxy_user" && proxyopts="--proxy=on --proxy-user=$proxy_user --proxypasswd=$proxy_passwd" }
export http_proxy
opts=`getopt "vlr:hi:" $*`
for i in $opts
do
case $i in
-h )
help_screen
;;
-v)
if [ -z "$verbose" ];
then
verbose="y"
else
set -x
fi
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;;
-r)
expect_r="y"
;;
-i)
expect_i="y"
;;
*)
test -n "$expect_r" &&
{
plug_name="$i"
unset expect_r
}
test -n "$expect_i" &&
{
install_plug="$i"
unset expect_i
}
;;
esac
done
test -n "$plug_name" && view_plugin "$plug_name"
test -n "$install_plug" && install_plugin "$install_plug"
tar="-xf"
test -z "$verbose" || tar="-xvf"
case `id` in uid=0*) ;; *)
echo "only root should use nessus-update-plugins"
exit 1
esac
if [ -n "$fetch_cmd" -a -n "$gzip" ] ;
then
cwd=`pwd`
tmpdir=$TEMPDIR
test -z "$tmpdir" &&
{
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tmpdir=$TMPDIR
test -z "$tmpdir" && tmpdir=/tmp
}
mkdir "$tmpdir/nessus-update-plugins-$$" || {
echo "Could not create temporary directory ($tmpdir/nessus-updateplugins-$$)"
exit 1
}
cd "$tmpdir/nessus-update-plugins-$$"
$fetch_cmd $proxyopts http://www.nessus.org/nasl/all-2.0.tar.gz > all-2.0.tar.gz
test -f all-2.0.tar.gz || {
echo "Downloading http://www.nessus.org/nasl/all-2.0.tar.gz failed"
cd "$cwd"
rm -rf "$tmpdir/nessus-update-plugins-$$"
exit 1
}
cat all-2.0.tar.gz | $gzip -cd 2>/dev/null > all-2.0.tar
test $? = 0 || {
mv all-2.0.tar.gz all-2.0.tar
# Some version of lynx gunzip data on the fly
}
cat all-2.0.tar | tar $tar rm all-2.0.tar
test -f nessus_detect.nasl || {
echo "Something went wrong when installing the plugins - uncompressing
the plugins archive failed"
cd "$cwd"
rm -rf "$tmpdir/nessus-update-plugins-$$"
exit 1
}
cp *.nasl "$pluginsdir/"
cp *.inc "$pluginsdir/"
cd "$cwd"
rm -rf "$tmpdir/nessus-update-plugins-$$"
chown 0 $pluginsdir/*.nasl
chgrp 0 $pluginsdir/*.inc
# HUP nessusd
test -f ${prefix}/var/nessus/nessusd.pid && {
pid=`cat ${prefix}/var/nessus/nessusd.pid`
kill -1 $pid 2>/dev/null
}
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exit 0
else
echo "Error \$fetch_cmd or \$gzip are not set - abort"
exit 1
fi

Automatically Updating the Nessus Application
The following script was created by the Nessus community to automatically
update the application.
#!/bin/sh
#nessusCVS.sh script
#used to update nessus on localhost
#minor modifications made by Jim Ashe and Rick Simons to
# a script posted on the Nessus FAQ.
NESSUSROOT=/usr/local/src
NESSUSLIBOPS="--disable-cipher"
NESSUSCOREOPS="--disable-cipher \
--enable-save-kb \
--enable-save-sessions \
--enable-gtk \
--enable-syslog"
if [ -f /usr/bin/sudo ]; then
SUDO="/usr/bin/sudo"
fi
cd $NESSUSROOT
addcvspass()
{
echo ":pserver:anonymous@cvs.nessus.org:/usr/local/cvs Ay=0=" >>
$HOME/.cvspass }
retrieve_by_cvs()
{
test -f $HOME/.cvspass || addcvspass
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grep ":pserver:anonymous@cvs.nessus.org:/usr/local/cvs" $HOME/.cvspass 2>&1
> /dev/null || addcvspass
CVSROOT=":pserver:anonymous@cvs.nessus.org:/usr/local/cvs"
export CVSROOT
# ************
# ************
# ************
# ************
# change update/checkout depending on if this is first install or not
cvs -z3 checkout $1 nessus-libraries
cvs -z3 checkout $1 libnasl
cvs -z3 checkout $1 nessus-core
cvs -z3 checkout $1 nessus-plugins
# change update/checkout depending on if this is first install or not
# ************
# ************
# ************
# ************
}
retrieve_by_cvs
# Kill running versions!
$SUDO killall nessusd
$SUDO killall nessus
# CLEANUP old stuff!
cd $NESSUSROOT/nessus-libraries
# uninstall-nessus begin
prefix=/usr/local
exec_prefix=${prefix}
bindir=${exec_prefix}/bin
sbindir=${exec_prefix}/sbin
libexecdir=${exec_prefix}/libexec
datadir=${prefix}/share
sysconfdir=${prefix}/etc
sharedstatedir=${prefix}/com
localstatedir=${prefix}/var
libdir=${exec_prefix}/lib
includedir=${prefix}/include
oldincludedir=/usr/include
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infodir=${prefix}/info
mandir=${prefix}/man
test "$1" = "-q" && quiet=yes
# check whether we have echo -n, depending
# on the current shell, used
case `echo -n` in
\-n) Xn= ; Xc='\c' ;;
*)
Xn=-n ; Xc=
esac
# make sure that we are root, if there is no id command,
# you loose, anyway
case `id 2>/dev/null` in
uid=0*)
;;
*)
echo "only root should use uninstall-nessus"
exit 1
esac
test -z "$quiet" &&
{
echo "--------------------------------------------------------------------------------"
echo "
UN-INSTALLATION OF NESSUS"
echo "--------------------------------------------------------------------------------"
}
#
# Step 2 - delete files
#
set -x
rm -f $bindir/nasl
rm -f $bindir/nasl-config
rm -f $bindir/nessus
rm -f $bindir/nessus-config
rm -f $bindir/nessus-build
rm -f $bindir/nessus-mkrand
rm -f $sbindir/nessus-adduser
rm -f $sbindir/nessus-rmuser
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rm -f $sbindir/nessusd
rm -f $sbindir/nessus-update-plugins
rm -f $sbindir/nessus-mkcert
rm -rf $includedir/nessus
rm -f
rm -f
rm -f
rm -f

$libdir/libhosts_gatherer.*
$libdir/libnasl.*
$libdir/libnessus.*
$libdir/libpcap-nessus.*

rm -rf $libdir/nessus
rm -f $mandir/man1/nasl-config.1
rm -f $mandir/man1/nasl.1
rm -f $mandir/man1/nessus-build.1
rm -f $mandir/man1/nessus-config.1
rm -f $mandir/man1/nessus.1
rm -f $mandir/man1/nessus-mkrand.1
rm -f $mandir/man8/nessus-mkcert.8
rm -f
rm -f
rm -f
rm -f

$mandir/man8/nessus-adduser.8
$mandir/man8/nessus-rmuser.8
$mandir/man8/nessus-update-plugins.8
$mandir/man8/nessusd.8

set +x
echo "Finished"
rm -f $sbindir/uninstall-nessus
# uninstall-nessus end
make distclean
cd $NESSUSROOT/libnasl
make distclean
cd $NESSUSROOT/nessus-core
make distclean
cd $NESSUSROOT/nessus-plugins
make distclean
# Now it's time to rock and roll.
cd $NESSUSROOT/nessus-libraries
./configure $NESSUSLIBOPS 2>&1|tee config.log
make 2>&1|tee make.log
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$SUDO make install 2>&1|tee make-install.log
$SUDO ldconfig
cd $NESSUSROOT/libnasl
./configure 2>&1|tee config.log
make 2>&1|tee make.log
$SUDO make install 2>&1|tee make-install.log
$SUDO ldconfig
cd $NESSUSROOT/nessus-core
./configure $NESSUSCOREOPS 2>&1|tee config.log
make 2>&1|tee make.log
$SUDO make install 2>&1|tee make-install.log
cd $NESSUSROOT/nessus-plugins
./configure 2>&1|tee config.log
make 2>&1|tee make.log
make install 2>&1|tee make-install.log
#$SUDO nessusd -D
/usr/local/sbin/nessusd –D
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APPENDIX D: CHARTS, TABLES AND DATA SAMPLES
OIT Administration Work Log Sample

Thesis Worklog
DATE

START

STOP

ACT

ACTIVITY DETAILS
Updated & compiled latest version of Nessus security scanner &
updated plugin information. Updated OS on Aeris.etsu.edu (22
packages). Called Janet & rolled to voice mail, left message.
Started Scanning .66.* & .67.*. Updated crontab and copied
some logger scripts. Scanned Jim Ashe's machine per his request,
discussed outcome. Talked with Steve, OIT wants to move Aeris
(the nessus server) to the break room to free up the conference
room. I advised I could move it whenever he wanted me to, but
he asked we wait another day or two. He updated me that a
windows machine was to be put together (so I can have access
9.10.02 8:00a 1:30p OIT
to REMEDY), once the parts were obtained.
Came in and the scan of Rogers Stout was *STILL* going. Checked
out what was going on and I had incorrectly used CIDR notation
and one of the settings for continuing to pursue dead machines
(punching thru software firewalls) was set which dramatically
increased the scan time per IP. Went to the Culp Center and
created a new ID, got some red tape and cost data from them as
the request was for Expiration date XX-XX-XXXX which they would
not honor. I requested, after much back and forth and their failed
attempts to contact OIT management, they put 1.01.03
tentatively. Reviewed the security scripts and updated some of
the mail scripts with some command line options I found in the
manual page for mail. Did some research, while the scan was still
9.12.02 8:00a 3:00p OIT
going, on how to disable some services in Win* operating systems.
Goals for Next Week
Move Aeris to break room. (T | R)
Get a phone for the conference room or move back to break room. (T)
Analyze the .67 & .68 results. (T)
Contact the .67 & .68 users & set up time on R to touch machines. (T)
Talk to Steve to find out the next building to touch. (T)
Contact Janet and get privacy document. (T) & Start scan of next building (T | R)
Touch as many machines as I can from .67 & .68 range. (.R)
Obsticles for Next Week
If a windows machine cannot be pieced together, find one to use REMEDY on temporarily.
If a phone cannot be found use the one in the break room temporarily.
Make sure to keep good notes for every machine touched and every phone call / interaction.
This will make the writeup easier, but also protect yourself as much as possible.
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Vulnerability Assessment Data Samples
Subnet Computer Vulnerability Output NSR Example

This is sample output from one of the subnet scans. The entire sweep contains
approximately 21,000 lines and is over 650 pages. It is truncated below for
brevity.
00.60.08.03.59.3b|unknown (135/tcp)|10736|INFO|;DCE services running on the
remote can be enumerated;by connecting on port 135 and doing the
appropriate;queries.;;An attacker may use this fact to gain more
knowledge;about the remote host.;;Solution : filter incoming traffic to this
port.;Risk factor : Low
00.60.08.03.59.3b|netbios-ssn (139/tcp)|10394|REPORT|;. It was possible to log
into the remote host using a NULL session.;The concept of a NULL session is to
provide a null username and;a null password, which grants the user the 'guest'
access;;To prevent null sessions, see MS KB Article Q143474 (NT 4.0) and;Q246261
(Windows 2000). ;Note that this won't completely disable null sessions, but will
;prevent them from connecting to IPC$;;. All the smb tests will be done as ''/'' in
domain
00.60.08.03.59.3b|netbios-ssn (139/tcp)|10398|INFO|The domain SID can be
obtained remotely. Its value is :;;PWRK12 : 5-21-2530647383-1337471377581806562;;An attacker can use it to obtain the list of the local users of this
host;Solution : filter the ports 137 to 139 and 445;Risk factor : Low;;CVE : CVE2000-1200;
00.60.08.03.59.3b|netbios-ssn (139/tcp)|10859|INFO|The host SID can be
obtained remotely. Its value is :;;PWRK12 : 5-21-2530647383-1337471377581806562;;An attacker can use it to obtain the list of the local users of this
host;Solution : filter the ports 137 to 139 and 445;Risk factor : Low;;CVE : CVE2000-1200;
00.60.08.03.59.3b|netbios-ssn (139/tcp)|10399|INFO|The domain SID could be
used to enumerate the names of the users;of this domain. ;(we only enumerated
users name whose ID is between 1000 and 1200;for performance reasons);This
gives extra knowledge to an attacker, which;is not a good thing : ;Administrator account name : monarch (id 500);- Guest account name : Guest
(id 501);- ETSUADMIN$ (id 1004);- mike (id 1008);- morgansd (id 1009);- test1 (id
1013);- test2 (id 1014);- morgans (id 1030);- wissell (id 1036);- whitet (id 1037);dively (id 1038);- brownd (id 1039);- blankenm (id 1043);- bader (id 1047);115

chenowet (id 1051);- myersn (id 1053);- greerg (id 1054);- fischman (id 1055);oxendine (id 1056);- moorecf (id 1057);- whiteb (id 1058);- woodsidj (id 1059);cass root (id 1061);- cassarchives (id 1063);- t_rudya (id 1064);- cassencyclo (id
1065);- casscass (id 1066);- bonnie (id 1068);- pagem (id 1080);- whitson (id
1081);- olson (id 1083);- waltersg (id 1086);- A (id 1175);- A73ETHEL (id 1176);ABELL (id 1177);- ABROWN (id 1178);- ACUFFR (id 1179);- ADAMSJ (id 1180);ADAMSL (id 1181);- ADAMSM (id 1182);- ADAMSS (id 1183);- ADDINGTO (id
1184);- ADDISON (id 1185);- ADDISONB (id 1186);- ADKINS (id 1187);- ADKINSR (id
1188);- AESCHLIM (id 1189);- AGARWAL (id 1190);- AHMADA (id 1191);- AIRHART
(id 1192);- AKARDL (id 1193);- AKERS (id 1194);- ALBRECHR (id 1195);- ALBRECHT
(id 1196);- ALDEN (id 1197);- ALEXANDC (id 1198);- ALFORD (id 1199);;Risk factor :
Medium;Solution : filter incoming connections this port;;CVE : CVE-2000-1200;
00.60.08.03.59.3b|netbios-ssn (139/tcp)|10907|INFO|;The guest user belongs to
groups other than ;guest users or domain guests.;;As guest should not have any
privilege, you should;fix this.;;Risk factor : Medium
00.60.08.03.59.3b|netbios-ssn (139/tcp)|10397|INFO|Here is the browse list of
the remote host : ;;ACCESS - PATHWORKS V6.0C for OpenVMS (Advanced
Server);ETSU83163 - ;ETSU84975 - ;JONESHOME - Jones Home;PWRK12BDC1 - NT
4.0 BDC;PWRK12NT - NT 4.0 BDC;PWRKCLU - PATHWORKS V6.0C for OpenVMS
(Alias);TAFR82915 - ;TAFR82916 - ;TAFR82923 - ;;;This is potentially dangerous as this
may help the attack;of a potential hacker by giving him extra targets to check
for;;Solution : filter incoming traffic to this port;Risk factor : Low;
00.60.08.03.59.3b|netbios-ssn (139/tcp)|10898|INFO|The following accounts
have never changed their password
:;;monarch;Guest;mike;morgansd;test1;test2;morgans;wissell;whitet;dively;brown
d;blankenm;bader;chenowet;myersn;greerg;fischman;oxendine;moorecf;white
b;woodsidj;t_rudya;bonnie;pagem;whitson;olson;waltersg;A;A73ETHEL;ABELL;ABR
OWN;ACUFFR;ADAMSJ;ADAMSL;ADAMSM;ADAMSS;ADDINGTO;ADDISON;ADDIS
ONB;ADKINS;ADKINSR;AESCHLIM;AGARWAL;AHMADA;AIRHART;AKARDL;AKERS;A
LBRECHR;ALBRECHT;ALDEN;ALEXANDC;ALFORD;;;To minimize the risk of break-in,
users should;change their password regularly
00.60.08.03.59.3b|netbios-ssn (139/tcp)|10899|INFO|The following accounts
have never logged in
:;;Guest;ETSUADMIN$;morgansd;test1;morgans;chenowet;t_rudya;whitson;ADAM
SJ;ADAMSM;ADAMSS;ADDINGTO;ADDISON;ADDISONB;ADKINSR;AESCHLIM;AGAR
WAL;AHMADA;AKARDL;AKERS;ALBRECHR;ALBRECHT;ALDEN;ALFORD;;;Unused
accounts are very helpful to hacker;Solution : suppress these accounts;Risk
factor : Medium
00.60.08.03.59.3b|netbios-ssn (139/tcp)|10900|INFO|The following accounts
have passwords which never expire
:;;monarch;Guest;mike;test1;test2;brownd;blankenm;chenowet;myersn;greerg;fis
chman;moorecf;woodsidj;t_rudya;olson;A;ACUFFR;;;Password should have a
limited lifetime;Solution : disable password non-expiry;Risk factor : Medium
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00.60.08.03.59.3b|netbios-ssn (139/tcp)|10785|NOTE|The remote native lan
manager is : NT LAN Manager 4.0;The remote Operating System is : Windows NT
4.0;The remote SMB Domain Name is : PWRK12;
00.60.08.03.59.3b|netbios-ssn (139/tcp)|10428|NOTE|;;Nessus did not access
the remote registry completely,;because this needs to be logged in as
administrator.;;If you want the permissions / values of all the sensitive;registry keys
to be checked for, we recommend that;you fill the 'SMB Login' options in
the;'Prefs.' section of the client by the administrator;login name and
password.;;** Since the password will be sent in clear text, we;suggest you
change its value for something else;during the test, as anyone will be able to
eavesdrop;it;;*** If you are working in a highly sensitive;environment where a
second of insecurity;may be critical to you, then forget this;warning and use
other tools to check locally;the security of your NT keys.;;Risk factor : None
00.60.08.03.59.3b|netbios-ssn (139/tcp)|10428|NOTE|;;Nessus did not access
the remote registry completely,;because this needs to be logged in as
administrator.;;If you want the permissions / values of all the sensitive;registry keys
to be checked for, we recommend that;you fill the 'SMB Login' options in
the;'Prefs.' section of the client by the administrator;login name and
password.;;** Since the password will be sent in clear text, we;suggest you
change its value for something else;during the test, as anyone will be able to
eavesdrop;it;;*** If you are working in a highly sensitive;environment where a
second of insecurity;may be critical to you, then forget this;warning and use
other tools to check locally;the security of your NT keys.;;Risk factor : None
00.60.08.03.59.3b|netbios-ssn (139/tcp)|10908|NOTE|The following users are in
the domain administrator group :;. monarch;;You should make sure that only the
proper users are member of this; group;Risk factor : Low
00.60.08.03.59.3b|netbios-ssn (139/tcp)|10895|NOTE|The following accounts
were disabled automatically by the system:;;Guest;;;This probably means that
these accounts were subject to brute force attacks;Risk factor : Low
00.60.08.03.59.3b|netbios-ssn (139/tcp)|10897|NOTE|The following accounts
are disabled :;;Guest;morgansd;AGARWAL;AKERS;ALDEN;;;To minimize the risk of
break-in, permanently disabled accounts;should be deleted;Risk factor : Low
00.60.08.03.59.3b|unknown (1027/tcp)|10736|NOTE|A DCE service is listening
on 151.141.8.183:1027 : ;; Type: ncacn_ip_tcp; UUID : 3457780d-3412-cd12abef-012345678900;
00.60.08.03.59.3b|unknown (1027/tcp)|
00.60.08.03.59.3b|unknown (2701/tcp)|
00.60.08.03.59.3b|unknown (2702/tcp)|
00.60.08.03.59.3b|unknown (8084/tcp)|
00.60.08.03.59.3b|general/tcp|10201|INFO|;The remote host uses non-random
IP IDs, that is, it is;possible to predict the next value of the ip_id field of;the ip
packets sent by this host.;;An attacker may use this feature to determine if the
remote;host sent a packet in reply to another request. This may be;used for
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portscanning and other things.;;Solution : Contact your vendor for a patch;Risk
factor : Low
00.60.08.03.59.3b|general/tcp|10201|INFO|;The remote host uses non-random
IP IDs, that is, it is;possible to predict the next value of the ip_id field of;the ip
packets sent by this host.;;An attacker may use this feature to determine if the
remote;host sent a packet in reply to another request. This may be;used for
portscanning and other things.;;Solution : Contact your vendor for a patch;Risk
factor : Low
00.60.08.03.59.3b|general/tcp|10336|NOTE|Nmap found that this host is
running Turtle Beach AudioTron Firmware 3.0, Windows NT4 or 95/98/98SE;
00.60.08.03.59.3b|general/tcp|10337|NOTE|QueSO has found out that the
remote host OS is ;* WindowsNT, Cisco 11.2(10a), HP/3000 DTC, BayStack
Switch;;;CVE : CAN-1999-0454;
00.60.08.03.59.3b|netbios-ns (137/udp)|10150|INFO|. The following 9 NetBIOS
names have been gathered :; PWRK12BDC1 ; PWRK12BDC1 ; PWRK12
;
PWRK12
; PWRK12
; PWRK12
; PWRK12BDC1 ; PWRK12
;
__MSBROWSE__ ;. The remote host has the following MAC address on its adapter
:; 0x00 0x60 0x08 0x03 0x59 0x3b ;;If you do not want to allow everyone to find
the NetBios name;of your computer, you should filter incoming traffic to this
port.;;Risk factor : Medium
00.60.08.03.59.3b|general/udp|10287|NOTE|For your information, here is the
traceroute to 151.141.8.183 : ;151.141.8.183;
00.60.08.03.59.3b|general/udp|
00.60.97.ac.28.96|unknown (135/tcp)|
00.60.97.ac.28.96|netbios-ssn (139/tcp)|10394|REPORT|;. It was possible to log
into the remote host using a NULL session.;The concept of a NULL session is to
provide a null username and;a null password, which grants the user the 'guest'
access;;To prevent null sessions, see MS KB Article Q143474 (NT 4.0) and;Q246261
(Windows 2000). ;Note that this won't completely disable null sessions, but will
;prevent them from connecting to IPC$;;. All the smb tests will be done as ''/'' in
domain
00.60.97.ac.28.96|netbios-ssn (139/tcp)|10398|INFO|The domain SID can be
obtained remotely. Its value is :;;ETSU : 5-21-606747145-1409082233-725345543;;An
attacker can use it to obtain the list of the local users of this host;Solution : filter
the ports 137 to 139 and 445;Risk factor : Low;;CVE : CVE-2000-1200;
00.60.97.ac.28.96|netbios-ssn (139/tcp)|10859|INFO|The host SID can be
obtained remotely. Its value is :;;SOFTSERV : 5-21-1708005366-5857103771136263860;;An attacker can use it to obtain the list of the local users of this
host;Solution : filter the ports 137 to 139 and 445;Risk factor : Low;;CVE : CVE2000-1200;
00.60.97.ac.28.96|netbios-ssn (139/tcp)|10399|INFO|The domain SID could be
used to enumerate the names of the users;of this domain. ;(we only enumerated
users name whose ID is between 1000 and 1200;for performance reasons);This
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gives extra knowledge to an attacker, which;is not a good thing : ;Administrator account name : Administrator (id 500);- Guest account name :
NotGuest (id 501);- TsInternetUser (id 1000);- IUSR_JCDC1 (id 1001);IWAM_JCDC1 (id 1002);- WINS Users (id 1003);- JCDC1$ (id 1004);- DnsAdmins (id
1105);- DnsUpdateProxy (id 1106);- QIP Users (id 1108);- JCDC2$ (id 1109);ETSUADMIN$ (id 1110);- ServiceAD (id 1111);- IMAIL$ (id 1112);- PWRK12$ (id
1113);- Exchange Domain Servers (id 1123);- Exchange Enterprise Servers (id
1124);- antivirus_root (id 1129);- IMailDevelopers (id 1130);- NAI Software Users (id
1131);- Networking (id 1132);- OIT (id 1133);- User Services (id 1137);- BCOOK (id
1138);- CAPPSL (id 1139);- COM (id 1146);- Multimedia (id 1147);- Test Group (id
1148);- 62E54D8C-5B5B-4373-8 (id 1151);- STEVE (id 1164);- ETSU86342$ (id 1166);WEBDEV$ (id 1173);- ETSU86343$ (id 1174);- ETSUFE1$ (id 1175);- B2FD3B0A-326343EF-A (id 1178);- HELPDESK2$ (id 1179);- ARAdmins (id 1181);- ETSUCM$ (id
1182);- loftusc (id 1184);- faculty root (id 1185);- Faculty web (id 1186);- TracData
(id 1187);- ABALDWIN (id 1188);- JANET (id 1189);- BachAccessDB (id 1190);Nursing (id 1191);- Registrar (id 1192);- ETSU87863$ (id 1193);- WAGOLD$ (id
1194);- mike (id 1195);- docwarehouse (id 1198);- BRAGG (id 1199);;Risk factor :
Medium;Solution : filter incoming connections this port;;CVE : CVE-2000-1200;
00.60.97.ac.28.96|netbios-ssn (139/tcp)|10860|INFO|The host SID could be
used to enumerate the names of the local users;of this host. ;(we only
enumerated users name whose ID is between 1000 and 1200;for performance
reasons);This gives extra knowledge to an attacker, which;is not a good thing : ;Administrator account name : Administrator (id 500);- Guest account name :
Guest (id 501);- SMSCliSvcAcct& (id 1003);- SMSCliToknAcct& (id 1004);;Risk
factor : Medium;Solution : filter incoming connections this port;;CVE : CVE-20001200;
00.60.97.ac.28.96|netbios-ssn (139/tcp)|10915|INFO|The following local
accounts have never logged in :;;Guest;;;Unused accounts are very helpful to
hacker;Solution : suppress these accounts;Risk factor : Medium
00.60.97.ac.28.96|netbios-ssn (139/tcp)|10916|INFO|The following local
accounts have passwords which never expire
:;;Administrator;Guest;SMSCliSvcAcct&;SMSCliToknAcct&;;;Password should have
a limited lifetime;Solution : disable password non-expiry;Risk factor : Medium
00.60.97.ac.28.96|netbios-ssn (139/tcp)|10900|INFO|The following accounts
have passwords which never expire :;;Administrator;;;Password should have a
limited lifetime;Solution : disable password non-expiry;Risk factor : Medium
00.60.97.ac.28.96|netbios-ssn (139/tcp)|10785|NOTE|The remote native lan
manager is : NT LAN Manager 4.0;The remote Operating System is : Windows NT
4.0;The remote SMB Domain Name is : ETSU;
00.60.97.ac.28.96|netbios-ssn (139/tcp)|10428|NOTE|;;Nessus did not access
the remote registry completely,;because this needs to be logged in as
administrator.;;If you want the permissions / values of all the sensitive;registry keys
to be checked for, we recommend that;you fill the 'SMB Login' options in
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the;'Prefs.' section of the client by the administrator;login name and
password.;;** Since the password will be sent in clear text, we;suggest you
change its value for something else;during the test, as anyone will be able to
eavesdrop;it;;*** If you are working in a highly sensitive;environment where a
second of insecurity;may be critical to you, then forget this;warning and use
other tools to check locally;the security of your NT keys.;;Risk factor : None
00.60.97.ac.28.96|netbios-ssn (139/tcp)|10428|NOTE|;;Nessus did not access
the remote registry completely,;because this needs to be logged in as
administrator.;;If you want the permissions / values of all the sensitive;registry keys
to be checked for, we recommend that;you fill the 'SMB Login' options in
the;'Prefs.' section of the client by the administrator;login name and
password.;;** Since the password will be sent in clear text, we;suggest you
change its value for something else;during the test, as anyone will be able to
eavesdrop;it;;*** If you are working in a highly sensitive;environment where a
second of insecurity;may be critical to you, then forget this;warning and use
other tools to check locally;the security of your NT keys.;;Risk factor : None
00.60.97.ac.28.96|netbios-ssn (139/tcp)|10913|NOTE|The following local
accounts are disabled :;;Guest;;;To minimize the risk of break-in, permanently
disabled accounts;should be deleted;Risk factor : Low
00.60.97.ac.28.96|unknown (2701/tcp)|
00.60.97.ac.28.96|unknown (2702/tcp)|
00.60.97.ac.28.96|unknown (6050/tcp)|
00.60.97.ac.28.96|unknown (8084/tcp)|
00.60.97.ac.28.96|unknown (41523/tcp)|
00.60.97.ac.28.96|general/tcp|10201|INFO|;The remote host uses non-random
IP IDs, that is, it is;possible to predict the next value of the ip_id field of;the ip
packets sent by this host.;;An attacker may use this feature to determine if the
remote;host sent a packet in reply to another request. This may be;used for
portscanning and other things.;;Solution : Contact your vendor for a patch;Risk
factor : Low
00.60.97.ac.28.96|general/tcp|10201|INFO|;The remote host uses non-random
IP IDs, that is, it is;possible to predict the next value of the ip_id field of;the ip
packets sent by this host.;;An attacker may use this feature to determine if the
remote;host sent a packet in reply to another request. This may be;used for
portscanning and other things.;;Solution : Contact your vendor for a patch;Risk
factor : Low
00.60.97.ac.28.96|general/tcp|10336|NOTE|Nmap found that this host is
running Microsoft NT 4.0 SP5-SP6;
00.60.97.ac.28.96|general/tcp|10337|NOTE|QueSO has found out that the
remote host OS is ;* WindowsNT, Cisco 11.2(10a), HP/3000 DTC, BayStack
Switch;;;CVE : CAN-1999-0454;
00.60.97.ac.28.96|netbios-ns (137/udp)|10150|INFO|. The following 6 NetBIOS
names have been gathered :; SOFTSERV
; ETSU
; SOFTSERV
;
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SOFTSERV
; ETSU
; SOFTSERV
;. The remote host has the following
MAC address on its adapter :; 0x00 0x60 0x97 0xac 0x28 0x96 ;;If you do not
want to allow everyone to find the NetBios name;of your computer, you should
filter incoming traffic to this port.;;Risk factor : Medium
00.60.97.ac.28.96|general/udp|10287|NOTE|For your information, here is the
traceroute to 151.141.8.175 : ;151.141.8.175;
00.60.97.ac.28.96|general/udp|
00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|smtp (25/tcp)|10258|REPORT|;;The remote SMTP server did
not complain when issued the;command :; MAIL FROM: |testing; ;This probably
means that it is possible to send mail ;that will be bounced to a program, which
is ;a serious threat, since this allows anyone to execute ;arbitrary commands on
this host.;;*** This security hole might be a false positive, since;*** some MTAs will
not complain to this test, but instead;*** just drop the message silently; ;Solution
: upgrade your MTA or change it.;;Risk factor : High;CVE : CVE-1999-0203;
00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|smtp (25/tcp)|10259|REPORT|;;The remote SMTP server did
not complain when issued the;command :; MAIL FROM: root@this_host; RCPT TO:
/tmp/nessus_test; ;This probably means that it is possible to send mail directly;to
files, which is a serious threat, since this allows;anyone to overwrite any file on
the remote server.;;*** This security hole might be a false positive, since;*** some
MTAs will not complain to this test, but instead;*** just drop the message
silently.;*** Check for the presence of file 'nessus_test' in /tmp !; ;Solution :
upgrade your MTA or change it.;;Risk factor : High
00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|smtp (25/tcp)|10261|REPORT|;;The remote SMTP server did
not complain when issued the;command :; MAIL FROM: root@this_host; RCPT TO:
|testing; ;This probably means that it is possible to send mail directly;to
programs, which is a serious threat, since this allows;anyone to execute arbitrary
commands on this host.;;*** This security hole might be a false positive, since;***
some MTAs will not complain to this test, but instead;*** just drop the message
silently.; ;Solution : upgrade your MTA or change it.;;Risk factor : High;CVE :
CAN-1999-0163;
00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|smtp (25/tcp)|10330|NOTE|An SMTP server is running on this
port;Here is its banner : ;220 jcdc2.etsu.edu Microsoft ESMTP MAIL Service,
Version: 5.0.2195.5329 ready at Mon, 16 Sep 2002 17:50:16 -0400
00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|smtp (25/tcp)|10263|NOTE|Remote SMTP server banner
:;jcdc2.etsu.edu Microsoft ESMTP MAIL Service, Version: 5.0.2195.5329 ready at
Mon, 16 Sep 2002 17:54:23 -0400 ;214-This server supports the following
commands:214 HELO EHLO STARTTLS RCPT DATA RSET MAIL QUIT HELP AUTH TURN
ATRN ETRN BDAT VRFY
;
00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|smtp (25/tcp)|11034|NOTE|For some reason, we could not
send the EICAR test string to this MTA
00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|domain (53/tcp)|
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00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|http (80/tcp)|10932|REPORT|;The IIS server appears to have
the .HTR ISAPI filter mapped.;;At least one remote vulnerability has been
discovered for the .HTR;filter. This is detailed in Microsoft Advisory;MS02-018, and
gives remote SYSTEM level access to the web server. ;;It is recommended that
even if you have patched this vulnerability that;you unmap the .HTR extension,
and any other unused ISAPI extensions;if they are not required for the operation
of your site.;;Solution: ;To unmap the .HTR extension:; 1.Open Internet Services
Manager. ; 2.Right-click the Web server choose Properties from the context
menu. ; 3.Master Properties ; 4.Select WWW Service -> Edit -> HomeDirectory ->
Configuration ;and remove the reference to .htr from the list.;;Risk factor : High
00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|http (80/tcp)|10077|INFO|;The remote web server appears to
be running with;Frontpage extensions. ;;You should double check the
configuration since;a lot of security problems have been found with;FrontPage
when the configuration file is;not well set up.;;Risk factor : High if your
configuration file is;not well set up;CVE : CAN-2000-0114;
00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|http (80/tcp)|10661|INFO|;IIS 5 has support for the Internet
Printing Protocol(IPP), which is ;enabled in a default install. The protocol is
implemented in IIS5 as an ;ISAPI extension. At least one security problem (a
buffer overflow);has been found with that extension in the past, so we
recommend;you disable it if you do not use this functionality.;;Solution: ;To
unmap the .printer extension:; 1.Open Internet Services Manager. ; 2.Right-click
the Web server choose Properties from the context menu. ; 3.Master Properties ;
4.Select WWW Service -> Edit -> HomeDirectory -> Configuration ;and remove
the reference to .printer from the list.;;Risk factor : Low
00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|http (80/tcp)|10695|INFO|;The IIS server appears to have the
.IDA ISAPI filter mapped.;;At least one remote vulnerability has been discovered
for the .IDA;(indexing service) filter. This is detailed in Microsoft Advisory;MS01033, and gives remote SYSTEM level access to the web server. ;;It is
recommended that even if you have patched this vulnerability that;you unmap
the .IDA extension, and any other unused ISAPI extensions;if they are not
required for the operation of your site.;;Solution: ;To unmap the .IDA extension:;
1.Open Internet Services Manager. ; 2.Right-click the Web server choose
Properties from the context menu. ; 3.Master Properties ; 4.Select WWW Service > Edit -> HomeDirectory -> Configuration ;and remove the reference to .ida from
the list.;;Risk factor : Medium;CVE : CAN-2002-0071;
00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|http (80/tcp)|10330|NOTE|A web server is running on this port
00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|http (80/tcp)|10107|NOTE|The remote web server type is
:;;Microsoft-IIS/5.0
;;Solution : None (IIS does not permit to hide the server version).
00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|http (80/tcp)|11032|NOTE|The following directories were
discovered:;/_vti_bin, /images;The following directories require
authentication:;/printers
00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|kerberos (88/tcp)|
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00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|unknown (135/tcp)|10736|NOTE|The DCE Service
'LRPC00000118.00000001' is running on this host; Type : ncalrpc; UUID :
5142350d-06e3-d14b-11ab-04c04fc2dc00; Annotation : MS NT Directory DRS
Interface;
00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|unknown (135/tcp)|10736|NOTE|The DCE Service
'LRPC00000118.00000001' is running on this host; Type : ncalrpc; UUID :
cc5a7c0d-64f5-1a42-108c-59082b2f8400; Annotation : MS NT Directory XDS
Interface;
00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|unknown (135/tcp)|10736|NOTE|The DCE Service
'LRPC00000118.00000001' is running on this host; Type : ncalrpc; UUID :
cc5a180d-64f5-1a42-108c-59082b2f8400; Annotation : MS NT Directory NSP
Interface;
00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|unknown (135/tcp)|10736|NOTE|The DCE Service
'LRPC00000118.00000001' is running on this host; Type : ncalrpc; UUID :
3456780d-3412-cd12-abef-01234567cf00;
00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|unknown (135/tcp)|10736|NOTE|The DCE Service
'LRPC000002fc.00000001' is running on this host; Type : ncalrpc; UUID :
6b0ce00d-0b90-67c7-10b3-17dd01066200;
00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|unknown (135/tcp)|
00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|netbios-ssn (139/tcp)|10394|REPORT|;. It was possible to log
into the remote host using a NULL session.;The concept of a NULL session is to
provide a null username and;a null password, which grants the user the 'guest'
access;;To prevent null sessions, see MS KB Article Q143474 (NT 4.0) and;Q246261
(Windows 2000). ;Note that this won't completely disable null sessions, but will
;prevent them from connecting to IPC$;;. All the smb tests will be done as ''/'' in
domain
00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|netbios-ssn (139/tcp)|10398|INFO|The domain SID can be
obtained remotely. Its value is :;;ETSU : 5-21-606747145-1409082233-725345543;;An
attacker can use it to obtain the list of the local users of this host;Solution : filter
the ports 137 to 139 and 445;Risk factor : Low;;CVE : CVE-2000-1200;
00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|netbios-ssn (139/tcp)|10859|INFO|The host SID can be
obtained remotely. Its value is :;;ETSU : 5-21-606747145-1409082233-725345543;;An
attacker can use it to obtain the list of the local users of this host;Solution : filter
the ports 137 to 139 and 445;Risk factor : Low;;CVE : CVE-2000-1200;
00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|netbios-ssn (139/tcp)|10399|INFO|The domain SID could be
used to enumerate the names of the users;of this domain. ;(we only enumerated
users name whose ID is between 1000 and 1200;for performance reasons);This
gives extra knowledge to an attacker, which;is not a good thing : ;Administrator account name : Administrator (id 500);- Guest account name :
NotGuest (id 501);- TsInternetUser (id 1000);- IUSR_JCDC1 (id 1001);IWAM_JCDC1 (id 1002);- WINS Users (id 1003);- JCDC1$ (id 1004);- DnsAdmins (id
1105);- DnsUpdateProxy (id 1106);- QIP Users (id 1108);- JCDC2$ (id 1109);ETSUADMIN$ (id 1110);- ServiceAD (id 1111);- IMAIL$ (id 1112);- PWRK12$ (id
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1113);- Exchange Domain Servers (id 1123);- Exchange Enterprise Servers (id
1124);- antivirus_root (id 1129);- IMailDevelopers (id 1130);- NAI Software Users (id
1131);- Networking (id 1132);- OIT (id 1133);- User Services (id 1137);- BCOOK (id
1138);- CAPPSL (id 1139);- COM (id 1146);- Multimedia (id 1147);- Test Group (id
1148);- 62E54D8C-5B5B-4373-8 (id 1151);- STEVE (id 1164);- ETSU86342$ (id 1166);WEBDEV$ (id 1173);- ETSU86343$ (id 1174);- ETSUFE1$ (id 1175);- B2FD3B0A-326343EF-A (id 1178);- HELPDESK2$ (id 1179);- ARAdmins (id 1181);- ETSUCM$ (id
1182);- loftusc (id 1184);- faculty root (id 1185);- Faculty web (id 1186);- TracData
(id 1187);- ABALDWIN (id 1188);- JANET (id 1189);- BachAccessDB (id 1190);Nursing (id 1191);- Registrar (id 1192);- ETSU87863$ (id 1193);- WAGOLD$ (id
1194);- mike (id 1195);- docwarehouse (id 1198);- BRAGG (id 1199);;Risk factor :
Medium;Solution : filter incoming connections this port;;CVE : CVE-2000-1200;
00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|netbios-ssn (139/tcp)|10785|NOTE|The remote native lan
manager is : Windows 2000 LAN Manager;The remote Operating System is :
Windows 5.0;The remote SMB Domain Name is : ETSU;
00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|netbios-ssn (139/tcp)|10428|NOTE|;;Nessus did not access
the remote registry completely,;because this needs to be logged in as
administrator.;;If you want the permissions / values of all the sensitive;registry keys
to be checked for, we recommend that;you fill the 'SMB Login' options in
the;'Prefs.' section of the client by the administrator;login name and
password.;;** Since the password will be sent in clear text, we;suggest you
change its value for something else;during the test, as anyone will be able to
eavesdrop;it;;*** If you are working in a highly sensitive;environment where a
second of insecurity;may be critical to you, then forget this;warning and use
other tools to check locally;the security of your NT keys.;;Risk factor : None
00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|netbios-ssn (139/tcp)|10428|NOTE|;;Nessus did not access
the remote registry completely,;because this needs to be logged in as
administrator.;;If you want the permissions / values of all the sensitive;registry keys
to be checked for, we recommend that;you fill the 'SMB Login' options in
the;'Prefs.' section of the client by the administrator;login name and
password.;;** Since the password will be sent in clear text, we;suggest you
change its value for something else;during the test, as anyone will be able to
eavesdrop;it;;*** If you are working in a highly sensitive;environment where a
second of insecurity;may be critical to you, then forget this;warning and use
other tools to check locally;the security of your NT keys.;;Risk factor : None
00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|ldap (389/tcp)|
00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|https (443/tcp)|10330|NOTE|An unknown service is running
on this port.;It is usually reserved for HTTPS
00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|https (443/tcp)|
00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|microsoft-ds (445/tcp)|10330|NOTE|An unknown service is
running on this port.;It is usually reserved for SMTPS
00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|microsoft-ds (445/tcp)|
00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|kpasswd (464/tcp)|
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00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|unknown (593/tcp)|10763|INFO|This detects the http-rpcepmap service by connecting;to the port 593 and processing the buffer
received.;;This endpoint mapper provides CIS (COM+ Internet
Services);parameters like port 135 (epmap) for RPC.;;Solution:;Deny incoming
traffic from the Internet to TCP port 593;as it may become a security threat in the
future, if a;vulnerability is discovered.;;For more information about
CIS:;http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/en-us/dndcom/html/cis.asp;;Risk factor :
Low
00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|ldaps (636/tcp)|
00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|unknown (1026/tcp)|10736|NOTE|A DCE service is listening
on 151.141.8.101:1026 : ;; Type: ncacn_ip_tcp; UUID : 5142350d-06e3-d14b11ab-04c04fc2dc00; Annotation : MS NT Directory DRS Interface;
00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|unknown (1026/tcp)|10736|NOTE|A DCE service is listening
on 151.141.4.7:1026 : ;; Type: ncacn_ip_tcp; UUID : 5142350d-06e3-d14b11ab-04c04fc2dc00; Annotation : MS NT Directory DRS Interface;
00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|unknown (1026/tcp)|10736|NOTE|A DCE service is listening
on 151.141.8.101:1026 : ;; Type: ncacn_ip_tcp; UUID : cc5a7c0d-64f5-1a42108c-59082b2f8400; Annotation : MS NT Directory XDS Interface;
00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|unknown (1026/tcp)|10736|NOTE|A DCE service is listening
on 151.141.4.7:1026 : ;; Type: ncacn_ip_tcp; UUID : cc5a7c0d-64f5-1a42108c-59082b2f8400; Annotation : MS NT Directory XDS Interface;
00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|unknown (1026/tcp)|10736|NOTE|A DCE service is listening
on 151.141.8.101:1026 : ;; Type: ncacn_ip_tcp; UUID : cc5a180d-64f5-1a42108c-59082b2f8400; Annotation : MS NT Directory NSP Interface;
00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|unknown (1026/tcp)|10736|NOTE|A DCE service is listening
on 151.141.4.7:1026 : ;; Type: ncacn_ip_tcp; UUID : cc5a180d-64f5-1a42108c-59082b2f8400; Annotation : MS NT Directory NSP Interface;
00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|unknown (1026/tcp)|10736|NOTE|A DCE service is listening
on 151.141.8.101:1026 : ;; Type: ncacn_ip_tcp; UUID : 3456780d-3412-cd12abef-01234567cf00;
00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|unknown (1026/tcp)|10736|NOTE|A DCE service is listening
on 151.141.4.7:1026 : ;; Type: ncacn_ip_tcp; UUID : 3456780d-3412-cd12abef-01234567cf00;
00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|unknown (1026/tcp)|
00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|unknown (1029/tcp)|10761|INFO|There is a CIS (COM+
Internet Services) on this port;Server banner :;ncacn_http/1.0
00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|unknown (1029/tcp)|10736|NOTE|A DCE service is listening
on 151.141.8.101:1029 : ;; Type: ncacn_ip_unknown!; UUID : 5142350d-06e3d14b-11ab-04c04fc2dc00; Annotation : MS NT Directory DRS Interface;
00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|unknown (1029/tcp)|10736|NOTE|A DCE service is listening
on 151.141.4.7:1029 : ;; Type: ncacn_ip_unknown!; UUID : 5142350d-06e3d14b-11ab-04c04fc2dc00; Annotation : MS NT Directory DRS Interface;
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00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|unknown (1029/tcp)|10736|NOTE|A DCE service is listening
on 151.141.8.101:1029 : ;; Type: ncacn_ip_unknown!; UUID : cc5a7c0d-64f51a42-108c-59082b2f8400; Annotation : MS NT Directory XDS Interface;
00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|unknown (1029/tcp)|10736|NOTE|A DCE service is listening
on 151.141.4.7:1029 : ;; Type: ncacn_ip_unknown!; UUID : cc5a7c0d-64f51a42-108c-59082b2f8400; Annotation : MS NT Directory XDS Interface;
00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|unknown (1029/tcp)|10736|NOTE|A DCE service is listening
on 151.141.8.101:1029 : ;; Type: ncacn_ip_unknown!; UUID : cc5a180d-64f51a42-108c-59082b2f8400; Annotation : MS NT Directory NSP Interface;
00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|unknown (1029/tcp)|10736|NOTE|A DCE service is listening
on 151.141.4.7:1029 : ;; Type: ncacn_ip_unknown!; UUID : cc5a180d-64f51a42-108c-59082b2f8400; Annotation : MS NT Directory NSP Interface;
00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|unknown (1029/tcp)|10736|NOTE|A DCE service is listening
on 151.141.8.101:1029 : ;; Type: ncacn_ip_unknown!; UUID : 3456780d-3412cd12-abef-01234567cf00;
00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|unknown (1029/tcp)|10736|NOTE|A DCE service is listening
on 151.141.4.7:1029 : ;; Type: ncacn_ip_unknown!; UUID : 3456780d-3412cd12-abef-01234567cf00;
00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|unknown (1040/tcp)|
00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|unknown (1088/tcp)|
00.06.5b.1a.57.6f|unknown (1147/tcp)|
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